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All parties to the litigation are listed in the caption. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is premised upon Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. IS THERE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS REGARDING WHAT ASSETS WERE 
OWNED BY NEW BINGHAM MARY MINING COMPANY ("MARY") AS 
OF THE DATE OF THE MERGER AND THE VALUE OF MARY'S SHARES 
BASED ON THOSE ASSETS? 
The ultimate determination of fair value of a corporation's shares is a question of fact. 
Hogle v. Zinetics Med.. Inc.. 2002 UT 121, f 10,63 P.3d80. Whether a given fact is relevant 
to fair value is a question of law. Id The finding of breach of fiduciary duty by self-dealing 
is a question of fact. Hansen v. Granite Holding Co.. 117 Utah 530, 218 P.2d 274, 279-80 
(1950). A trial court's findings of fact, "whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a); Wilson Supply. Inc. v. FradanMfg. Corp.. 2002 UT 94, ^ 12,54 P.3d 1177. 
The trial court found that Mary's assets included claims for breach of fiduciary duties 
and also included property rights of significant value. R. 1154-55,^40-41. The court also 
found that Mary's value had been dramatically reduced through the self-dealing of Mary's 
majority shareholder and management, and that Mary's fair value was not limited to the 
value remaining after the majority shareholder's self-dealing. R. 1154-55, ^[39-41. 
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Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-1301f41-1330(1); Hogle v. Zinetics 
Med.. Inc.. 2002 UT 121, 63 P.3d 80; Hansen v. Granite Holding Co.. 117 Utah 530, 218 
P.2d 274 (1950). 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMIT EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
REGARDING THE INTENT OF A MINING LEASE, I.E., IS THERE 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT THE MINING LEASE WAS AMBIGUOUS, AND TO 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LEASE? 
Whether a trial court has properly admitted evidence is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp.. 2004 UT 28, [^10. Interpretation of the 
intentions of the parties to a contract based on extrinsic evidence is a question of fact. 
Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). A trial court's findings of fact, 
"whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Wilson Supply. Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. 
Corp.. 2002 UT 94, f 12, 54 P.3d 1177. 
The trial court found extrinsic evidence concerning the intent of the parties to a lease 
is admissible to allow the trial court to determine whether the lease is ambiguous and to 
interpret the lease. R. 1160, %51. The trial court found the mining lease does not grant a 
right to remove or strip waste material from Mary's property for the purpose of mining ore 
on adjacent property. R. 1148, |^24. 
Determinative Law: Nielsen v. Gold's Gvm. 2003 UT 37,78 P.3d 600; Yeargin. Inc. 
v. TaxComm'n. 2001 UT 11, 20 P.3d 287. 
2 
III. IS THERE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT THE RIGHT TO STRIP THE 
SURFACE OF THE PROPERTIES AT ISSUE HAD A VALUE OF 
APPROXIMATELY $32 MILLION AS OF THE DATE OF THE MERGER? 
The determination of fair value is a question of fact. Hogle v. Zinetics Med.. Inc.. 
2002 UT 121,1fl0, 63 P.3d 80. A trial court's findings of fact, "whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a); Wilson Supply. Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp.. 2002 UT 94, U12,54 P.3d 1177. 
The trial court found the fair value of the stripping rights owned by Mary was 
approximately $32.6 million. R. 1158, f44(i). 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-1301(41 -1330(1); Hogle v. Zinetics 
Med.. Inc.. 2002 UT 121, 63 P.3d 80. 
IV. IS THERE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT THE MAJORITY AND 
CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER FAILED TO DISCLOSE AND 
CONCEALED ITS SELF-DEALING WITH THE COMPANY AND THAT 
THE MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THEIR 
CLAIMS? 
The factual determination of when a person reasonably should know that he or she 
has suffered a legal injury is a question of fact. Spears v. Warr. 2002 UT 24, f32, 44 P.3d 
742. A trial court's findings of fact, "whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Wilson 
Supply. Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp.. 2002 UT 94, ^ [12, 54 P.3d 1177. 
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The trial court found the minority shareholders did not have notice of facts giving rise 
to legal claims for, did not lack diligence and did not delay unreasonably in asserting claims 
for, and did not take any position inconsistent with any prior position with respect to legal 
claims for breaches of fiduciary duties. R. 1150,1f33; R. 1153,1f37; 1164-65, ffi[58-59. 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a proceeding to determine the fair value of dissenting minority shareholders' 
shares of a merged-out corporation, New Bingham Mary Mining Company ("Mary55), under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-13 3 0(1). Following a three day trial to the bench, the court 
found that Mary had specific assets of significant value as of the date of the merger. Based 
on those assets, the trial court found the fair value of the merged-out corporation was 
approximately $36 million, and that the dissenting minority shareholders were entitled to 
payment in the amount of approximately $1,325 million, representing their 3.8 percent 
ownership of Mary's shares at the time of the merger, plus interest. Bingham Consolidation 
Company, the successor corporation into which Mary merged, appeals the court's valuation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Following a three day bench trial, the trial court entered the following findings of 
fact:1 
^ h e Brief of Appellant, Bingham Consolidation Company purports to contain a 
statement of facts required by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Instead of stating 
findings of fact entered by the trial court, however, the Appellant attempts to rehash and 
characterize disputed evidence in a light contrary to the court's express findings of fact. 
Consequently, the Appellant's Statement of Facts should be disregarded. 
4 
Mary was a Utah corporation incorporated in 1929. R. 1142, ffl[l-2. Since Mary's 
inception, members of the Groesbeck family were minority shareholders, including 
defendants Robert Groesbeck, Marilyn Groesbeck Glade, and the Robert R. Groesbeck 
Living Trust (collectively, "Groesbecks"). IcL f2. Pursuant to a merger agreement 
("Merger"), Mary's majority and controlling shareholder, Kennecott Utah Copper 
Corporation (together with its predecessor in interest, Kennecott Corporation, "Kennecott"), 
caused Mary to be merged with and into plaintiff Bingham Consolidation Company ("BCC") 
effective January 1, 1998. R. 1142-43, | 3 . Kennecott is the sole shareholder of BCC, the 
surviving corporation under to the Merger. Id The Groesbecks dissented from the Merger, 
and this action was brought to determine the fair value of the Groesbecks' shares ("Shares") 
of Mary. R. 1143 ,^4 ,7 . 
The area of the Oquirrh Mountains relevant to this lawsuit is referred to herein as the 
"Bingham District." For decades, Kennecott has controlled mining properties within the 
Bingham District lying east of an irregular, approximately north-south boundary line located 
near the western edge of Kennecott's Bingham open-pit copper mine ("Bingham Mine"). 
Mining properties lying west of the boundary were previously controlled by a different 
mining company, The Anaconda Company ("Anaconda"). R. 1144-45, [^12. From its 
inception, and at the time of the Merger, Mary's assets included, among other assets, two 
patented mining claims, the Mary Claim and the Commonwealth Claim ("Claims" or 
"Mining Claims"). R. 1143, | 8 . Mary's Claims were located at the boundary of the 
Kennecott and Anaconda properties, adjacent to Kennecott's open-pit Bingham Mine on one 
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side and adjacent to and part of Anaconda's underground Carr Fork Mine on the other side. 
R. 1144-45,1fl2. 
The Claims and the surrounding area of the Bingham District contain two kinds of 
ore: higher-grade ore located at greater depth, so-called "skarn" ore; and lower-grade ore 
located at shallower depth, so-called "porphyry55 ore. The deeper, skarn ore was mined 
formerly in the Bingham District by Anaconda using underground mining methods. The 
shallower porphyry ore is mined in the Bingham District by Kennecott using open-pit or strip 
mining methods. R. 1143-44, ^ [9. Due to Kennecott's mining activities, the Claims are now 
located within the Bingham Mine operated by Kennecott. R. 1143, f 8. 
With respect to open-pit mining methods, the trial court entered critical findings of 
fact regarding the value to be ascribed to the right to strip waste material from the surface 
of the Claims. Removing ore safely by open-pit methods requires stripping back the sides 
of the open pit at a relatively shallow angle to remove waste overlying and adjacent to the 
ore, otherwise the walls of the pit will be too steep and collapse into the open pit. Thus, 
safely constructing an open-pit mine with walls constructed at a safely shallow angle requires 
the right to strip waste from the surface over an area larger than the area of the ore body to 
be mined. R. 1144, [^10. On properties located closer to the center of an open pit mine, 
waste material is stripped from the surface first, then the underlying ore material is mined 
after the waste material is removed. On properties located toward the edge of the pit, waste 
material is stripped from the surface, but no ore material is mined from the properties. 
Although no ore material is mined from those properties, stripping the waste from those 
6 
properties provides necessary access to ore contained in properties located closer to the 
center of the open pit mine. Id. f l l . 
Accordingly, the trial court found that "stripping rights/' that is, the right to strip 
waste from the surface of a property, have value that is separate from the right to mine ore 
from a property, regardless of whether the ore from the property is mined at the surface or 
underground. Id The value of the stripping rights on a particular piece of property depends 
upon the amount of ore that could not otherwise be mined without the stripping rights. Id 
That value is independent of and in addition to the value of whatever ore material may be 
contained within the particular piece of property. Id. 
The trial court found the value of Mary to be $37.11 per share, or approximately $36 
million. R. 1158-59, f 45. That value includes the value of stripping rights associated with 
the Claims, Mary's cash assets, the value of porphyry mineralization contained within the 
Claims, and the value of deeper skarn mineralization contained within the Claims. Li 
Significant evidence in the record supports both the trial court's finding that stripping rights 
have value independent of the value of ore contained within a piece of property and the 
court's finding of the value of the stripping rights associated with the Claims. 
The evidence is essentially undisputed that stripping rights have significant value. 
Kennecott's own employees, one of whom became the manager of Kennecott's Bingham 
Mine and one of whom became president of Kennecott, completed a study in 1981 that 
analyzed the value of stripping rights associated with the Claims and other properties owned 
by Anaconda at the time. R. 1192, pp.96-97; R. 1193, pp. 160-61, 169. That study 
concluded that the stripping rights associated with those properties were worth billions of 
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dollars in net income, would provide access to ore not otherwise available to be mined, and 
would extend the life of Kennecott's mine by years. R. 1192,pp.97-98;R. 1193, pp. 169-72; 
Ex. 101,pp.5-6, 16. 
The importance and value of stripping rights is likewise reflected in a 1963 draft 
agreement among Kennecott, Mary, and Anaconda that would have granted Kennecott the 
right of "conducting such operations as are deemed advisable by Kennecott in the over-all 
open pit operation of its [Bingham Mine], including but not limited to the right... to strip, 
excavate, mine and remove or carry away.. . the surface and subsurface and the overburden 
in, upon, and under" the Claims and other properties controlled by Anaconda. The draft 
agreement notes it would be impracticable for Kennecott to mine ore from its own lands 
unless it obtained the right to strip the surface of the Claims and Anaconda's properties. Ex. 
127, pp.1, 4. 
In 1978, Mary's management sent a letter to its minority shareholders informing them 
there had been recent negotiations among Mary, Kennecott, and Anaconda "to agree on a 
three-party cross-stripping agreement which would allow Kennecott to expand the 
boundaries of its Bingham open-pit mine by stripping waste material and low-grade ore 
material from the surface of property of Anaconda and New Bingham Mary adjacent to the 
present boundaries of the Bingham pit." Ex. 108, p.3. Kennecott's internal memoranda refer 
to the "critical location" of the Claims and note Kennecott needed to resolve the issue of 
stripping rights before it could strip across the Claims. Exs. 104, 105. 
BCC's own expert witness recognized that hard rock mining requires operational 
lands around the mineral deposit. He also recognized that Kennecott's operations were 
8 
adversely affected by its inability to strip the surface of neighboring properties and 
acknowledged that Kennecott had attempted without success for years to acquire the 
stripping rights. R. 1192, pp.68-69. He also noted that Kennecott eventually acquired 
Anaconda's property for the purpose of enhancing its open-pit operations. Ex. 23, pp.9-10. 
BCC's other witness, a former Kennecott manager who was also an officer of Mary, testified 
that ore located on Kennecott's property would be unreachable without the right to strip the 
surface of the Claims. R. 1193, pp.164, 172. He also testified that net income may be 
realized by acquiring stripping rights, and a rational economic actor would pay for the right 
to strip the surface of the Claims if they produced net income. IdL, pp. 167-69. 
The value of the stripping rights associated with the Claims was established by the 
trial testimony of the Groesbecks' expert witnesses, Bernard J. Guarnera and Donald P. 
Bellum. R. 1155-59, ^[43-45. Mr. Guarnera has more than forty years experience in the 
mining industry, specializing in the valuation of mineral properties and mining companies. 
His vast experience includes analysis and valuation of mining properties, mining property 
acquisitions, and negotiating and evaluating mining leases for major mining companies and 
other corporations. R. 1193, pp.293-300; Ex. 126 at Appendix 1. Likewise, Mr. Bellum has 
decades of experience in the mining industry, including performing valuations and 
acquisitions of mining properties, including several copper mine acquisition programs, and 
operating a number of mines and mining divisions for major corporations. R. 1193, pp.258-
63; Ex. 126 at Appendix 1. 
Based on his knowledge and experience in the mining industry, Mr. Guarnera testified 
hat a willing, prudent buyer would pay and a willing, prudent seller would sell the right to 
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strip the surface of the Claims in return for a two percent net smelter returns royalty from the 
sale of minerals that otherwise would be inaccessible without the right to strip the surface 
of the Claims. R. 1194, pp.331-32, 339,365. Based on his knowledge and experience, Mr. 
Bellum testified a willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would sell the right to strip 
the surface of the Claims in return for fifteen percent of the net cash flows that would be 
generated from the sale of minerals otherwise inaccessible without the right to strip the 
surface of the Claims. R. 1193, pp.282-83. The Groesbecks' experts testified that they 
applied discounted cash flow methods to calculate the net present value of the income that 
would be derived from a two percent net smelter returns royalty and/or fifteen percent of the 
net cash flows. R. 1193, p.281; R. 1194, p.333. The trial court found the expertise and 
qualifications of Messrs. Guarnera and Bellum unquestionable by reason of their skills, 
backgrounds, education, and experience, and found their expert testimony reliable, helpful, 
and persuasive in determining the fair value of Mary's assets. R. 1155-56,1fl[43, 44. 
The court adopted the appraisal and methodology of Messrs. Guarnera and Bellum 
and, on that basis, found the fair value of the stripping rights associated with the Claims was 
approximately $32.6 million. R. 1158,1f44(i). Although BCC affects disbelief at the notion 
Kennecott would pay $32.6 million for such rights, the trial court entered a finding of fact 
that the stripping rights control access to ore reasonably projected by the income method of 
valuation to generate more than $3 billion in gross revenues. R. 1157, f 44(f). This amounts 
to more than $762 million in profit with a net present value of more than $238 million as of 
the date of the Merger. Id BCC does not dispute these findings. Moreover, the $32.6 
million figure represents the net present value of royalties and payments to Mary that would 
10 
accrue over the life of the mine. It need not have been paid out in a lump sum but for the 
squeeze out merger that occurred. 
Furthermore, the Groesbecks' expert testified that, even after paying Mary the fan-
value of the stripping rights, Kennecott would still realize an acceptable rate of return on 
investment of 26 to 27 percent. R. 1193, p.283. He also testified that many mining 
companies make investments for lower returns. IdL In light of the enormous benefit derived 
from the right to strip the surface of the Claims and the favorable rate of return on 
investment, the court correctly recognized a prudent buyer would pay a 2 percent net smelter 
return royalty or 15 percent of net cash flows for the stripping rights. 
At trial, BCC argued the Claims were encumbered by a lease ("Lease" or "Mining 
Lease") that purportedly gave Kennecott the right to strip the surface of the Claims without 
compensating Mary. BCC argued Mary's minority shareholders were therefore not entitled 
to their proportionate share of the value of the stripping rights. The trial court rejected 
BCC's argument and made specific findings of fact demonstrating the fair value of Mary 
included the value of the stripping rights. 
The Lease was entered into between Anaconda and Mary as of April 30, 1979. R. 
1194, f 17. At that time, Anaconda was the majority and controlling shareholder of Mary, 
owning approximately 86.6 percent of the issued and outstanding stock of Mary. IdL Under 
the Lease, Anaconda was permitted to perform underground mining operations on the Claims 
through facilities at Anaconda's underground Carr Fork Mine. Id The Lease provided that 
Mary would receive minimum annual royalties of $25,000 per year from Anaconda to be 
credited against a three percent net smelter return production royalty on ore Anaconda mined 
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from the Claims. Id The Lease provided that assignment of Anaconda's interest in the 
Lease without Mary's prior written consent was void and terminated the Lease at Mary's 
option. R. 1147-48,1(23. 
In 1985, Kennecott purchased Anaconda's shares of Mary and became Mary's 
majority and controlling shareholder. R. 1147, f21. From the time Kennecott purchased 
Anaconda's shares in 1985 until the Merger, all of Mary's officers and directors were also 
officers, directors, or employees of Kennecott. As such, the trial court found a conflict of 
interest existed between Kennecott and its designated officers, directors and employees 
whom it caused to be elected as Mary's officers and directors (on the one hand), and Mary 
and Mary's minority shareholders (on the other hand) with respect to dealings in which the 
interests of Kennecott were adverse to the interests of Mary and Mary's minority 
shareholders. R. 1147, Tf22. 
Anaconda's interest under the Lease was purportedly assigned to Kennecott on 
November 2, 1987. R. 1148, f 25. However, Mary's written consent to the assignment was 
not obtained prior to the assignment. Id Pursuant to the terms of the Lease, the assignment 
was void, and Mary had the right thereafter to terminate the Lease. Although Kennecott 
recognized that the purported assignment was void under the terms of the Lease and that 
Mary had the right thereafter to terminate the Lease, Kennecott did not cause Mary to 
terminate the Lease. IdL Rather, Kennecott subsequently caused Mary to execute its written 
consent to assignment of Anaconda's interest under the Lease to Kennecott on March 17, 
1988. Id. 
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The court found that, at the time Kennecott caused Mary to provide written consent 
to the assignment, Kennecott and Mary's officers and directors knew the value of the 
stripping rights and knew the Claims were in a critical location with respect to westward 
expansion of the Bingham Mine. R. 1149, f 27. The court further found that, to ensure that 
Mary and its minority shareholders received fair value for the stripping rights, independent 
officers and directors of Mary would have terminated the Lease after Anaconda's interest 
under the Lease was assigned to Kennecott without Mary's written consent. R. 1148-49, 
f26. Moreover, the court found Kennecott's self-dealing with respect to the Lease 
constituted breaches of the fiduciary duties of Kennecott and Mary's officers and directors 
designated by Kennecott. R. 1151, f 35(c); R. 1153, f36. 
The court further found Kennecott and Mary's officers and directors breached their 
fiduciary duties to Mary and Mary's minority shareholders because they: (1) failed to seek 
or obtain the judgment of independent directors, independent legal counsel, or independent, 
disinterested third-parties ("impartial judgment") to protect Mary's rights with respect to 
assignment of Anaconda's interest in the Mining Lease to Kennecott; (2) failed to inform 
Mary's minority shareholders that Mary's prior written consent was not obtained before the 
purported assignment of Anaconda's interest to Kennecott; (3) failed to inform Mary's 
minority shareholders that the Lease assignment was void because Mary had not given its 
written consent prior to the assignment, and that Mary could terminate the Lease; (4) failed 
to inform and concealed from Mary's minority shareholders that Kennecott had begun 
stripping waste from the surface of the Claims in 1989 and continued to do so, and that 
Cennecott had begun removing ore from the Claims during 1995 and continued to do so; (5) 
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failed to object to Kennecott's stripping of waste and mining of ore, even though the 
assignment was void and the Lease was terminable at Mary's will; (6) failed to seek or obtain 
an impartial judgment regarding the valuation of Mary's assets and shares for purposes of 
the Merger; and (7) failed to inform Mary's minority shareholders of the value of Mary's 
assets, including the value of the right to strip the surface of the Claims. R. 1151-53, ffl[35-
36. 
The court therefore found that Mary's assets at the time of the Merger included 
Mary's claims against its officers, directors, and majority shareholder for self-dealing in 
breach of their respective fiduciary duties to Mary and its minority shareholders. In the 
alternative, the court found Mary's assets included the value of the Claims unencumbered 
by the Lease, which independent officers and directors would have terminated because the 
Lease did not compensate Mary for the value of the stripping rights. R. 1154-55, ^[40-41. 
BCC does not challenge the findings that the breaches occurred. Instead, it challenges 
the trial court's factual findings that the legal claims against Kennecott and Mary's officers 
and directors were not barred by the statute of limitations, laches, and estoppel. After a full 
and fair hearing on the merits, however, the court made specific findings of fact that the 
minority shareholders, including the Groesbecks, did not have notice, nor through the 
exercise of reasonable care should have had notice, of facts giving rise to legal claims against 
Kennecott and Mary's officers and directors for breaches of fiduciary duty and self-dealing. 
R. 1150, f33; 1153, f37; R. 1164, ^ [58. The court further found that the Groesbecks did not 
lack diligence or delay unreasonably in asserting claims for breaches of fiduciary duties, nor 
was BCC prejudiced by any alleged lack of diligence or delay by the Groesbecks in asserting 
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the claims. R. 1164, Tf59. Finally, the court found that by asserting the claims for breaches 
of fiduciary duties, the Groesbecks did not take any position inconsistent with any prior act, 
statement, or admission with respect to the legal claims. R. 1164-65, f 59. Accordingly, 
BCC's affirmative defenses were denied. IdL ffi[58-59. 
In addition to rejecting BCC's affirmative defenses, the trial court also rejected the 
appraisal of BCC's expert regarding the value of Mary's assets at the time of the Merger. 
BCC's expert, Gerald P. Hahnbacher, valued Mary's Shares at $1.10 per share, or 
approximately $1 million. R. 1143, f5; Ex. 23, p.i. The court found Mr. Halmbacher's 
appraisal did not reflect the fair value of Mary's assets or the Shares because it was not 
independent. R. 1155, ^ [42. Instead, the appraisal was based on information provided by 
Kennecott that could only lead to a determination that was unfairly favorable to Kennecott 
and BCC and prejudicial to the minority shareholders. IdL Significant evidence in the 
Record supports the trail court's findings. 
At trial, Mr. Hahnbacher testified he was asked by Kennecott to perform the appraisal 
of Mary for Kennecott, he knew his appraisal would rely on information provided by 
Kennecott even though he knew Kennecott was Mary's majority shareholder, he also knew 
his appraisal would be the basis on which minority shareholders would be compensated for 
their Shares, and he knew minority shareholders would have interests adverse to Kennecott. 
R. 1192, pp. 41-44,46. In the past, including in past work performed for Kennecott, when 
more than one party was interested in the results of his appraisal, Mr. Halmbacher had sought 
input from both parties. Id, pp. 12-13,35-36. In this case, Mr. Halmbacher sought no input 
from the minority shareholders, even though the appraisal process went through multiple 
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drafts (one of which valued Mary at half again what Mr. Hahnbacher's final appraisal valued 
it at) over a period of three years and received voluminous input from Kennecott. Id p.36; 
Exs. 113-121. 
In point of fact, the appraisal was effectively Kennecott's, not Mr. Halmbacher's. Mr. 
Hahnbacher initially testified he used a discounted cash flow analysis to appraise Mary, and 
a spreadsheet contained in his appraisal represented his analysis and his calculations. R. 
1192, pp.22-25. On cross-examination, though, he admitted that the spreadsheet was 
prepared by Kennecott using Kennecott's own assumptions. Id, p.52. Indeed, Mr. 
Halmbacher's appraisal adopted all of the data and assumptions provided by Kennecott, and 
Mr. Hahnbacher knew of no change to his appraisal report recommended by Kennecott that 
he did not incorporate into his report. Id, pp.51-52; Ex. 121. Among the key information 
contained in the spreadsheet are projected prices at which metals will be sold in the future. 
Mr. Hahnbacher adopted Kennecott's projected prices to the penny, but then proclaimed his 
independence in the body of his appraisal. R. 1192, p.50. But even his statement 
proclaiming his independence was not his own idea: it was inserted into the appraisal report 
at Kennecott's request. Ld, pp.51-52, Ex. 121, f 1. 
It is telling that for purposes of projecting Mary's cash flows in a spreadsheet dated 
August 13, 1997, Kennecott used a gold price of $325. R. 1192, p.54; Ex. 122. For 
purposes of projecting its own cash flows in a spreadsheet dated five days earlier, Kennecott 
used a gold price of $385 per ounce. Id, p. 54; Ex. 123. Mr. Hahnbacher incorporated the 
$325 figure into his appraisal report. Kennecott did see fit to tell Mr. Hahnbacher that the 
gold price it was using to project its own cash flows was $65 per ounce greater than the price 
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it wanted him to use to project Mary's cash flows. R. 1192, pp.54-55. Similarly, Kennecott 
provided information to Mr. Halmbacher concerning what Kennecott argued at trial was an 
asset sale comparable to the Merger, namely Kennecott's 1985 purchase of Anaconda's 
assets located in the Bingham District. IdL, pp.21-22; Ex. 23, pp.9-10. But Kennecott 
neglected to inform Mr. Halmbacher that Kennecott purchased Anaconda's assets for 
"nuisance value" and Kennecott paid "a minor amount of money" for Anaconda's assets. 
R. 1192, p.58; R. 1193, p. 148. Likewise, Kennecott failed to inform Mr. Halmbacher of its 
own 1981 analysis that showed the enormous value of the stripping rights, R. 1192, p.59, that 
the Claims were in a critical location with respect to expansion of the Bingham Mine, and 
that stripping rights had to be resolved with Mary before Kennecott could strip across the 
surface of the Claims. Id, pp.56-58. 
Kennecott thus saw to it that Mr. Halmbacher's appraisal report contained the 
information Kennecott wanted it to contain, but did not contain information Kennecott 
wanted excluded. Accordingly, the court found that Mary's majority and controlling 
shareholder, Kennecott, along with Mary's officers and directors hand-picked by Kennecott, 
failed to seek or obtain an impartial and independent appraisal of Mary's assets and Shares 
in breach of their fiduciary duty to Mary and its minority shareholders. R. 1152-53, f^ f 
35(k), 36. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court below found that the Merger occurred after years of self-dealing 
nabling Kennecott to mine billions of dollars of ore made accessible only through property 
wned by Mary. The statutory appraisal proceeding requires the court to identify the assets 
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of the merged out corporation and value those assets. After a full and fair hearing, the court 
identified the assets of Mary as of the date of the Merger. The court found that Mary's assets 
included, without limitation, property rights unencumbered by the sweetheart Mining Lease 
that should have been terminated years before, or, in the alternative, a coiporate right of 
action based on pervasive and continuing breaches of fiduciary duty. The court's valuation 
follows Utah law and ensures dissenting minority shareholders receive fair value for their 
shares. 
BCC argues the court should ignore the breaches of fiduciary duties in valuing Mary. 
Similar to the way Kennecott glossed over its duties to Mary, BCC's brief barely gives lip 
service to the significant and weighty fiduciary duties that are intended to protect a 
corporation and its minority shareholders. If those breaches were not now rectified, they 
would strip Mary of the enormous asset value associated with its Mining Claims. 
BCC's second attack on the valuation methodology involves the erroneous assertion 
that the value includes "unique" benefits that accrued to Kennecott through the Merger. But 
the court's valuation of the right to strip the surface of Mary's Mining Claims was properly 
based on a determination of the fair compensation rate a willing buyer and willing seller 
would negotiate in an arm's-length transaction for stripping rights. The court evaluated the 
competing testimony of the parties' experts and made the factual finding that the fair value 
was equal to a two percent net smelter returns royalty or fifteen percent of net cash flows 
derived from the benefit conferred by the stripping rights. The net present value of that 
compensation was then determined by applying discounted cash flow methods with reference 
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to information on mining plans and costs provided by Kennecott—the very same information 
used by BCC's expert to arrive at his valuation. 
Next, BCC urges that the court improperly considered extrinsic evidence to interpret 
the ambiguous terms of the Mining Lease. But the trial court followed binding Utah 
Supreme Court authority by considering extrinsic evidence to determine whether the Mining 
Lease was ambiguous and to interpret ambiguity it found resulted from missing terms. BCC 
argued at trial that the terms of the Lease impliedly allow the lessee to strip the surface of 
Mary's property to gain access to ore on adjacent property. But the term stripping is absent 
from the Lease, therefore the trial court considered extrinsic evidence to determine whether 
the reading BCC urged should be inferred. After considering evidence at trial, the court 
found it should not. The court's finding is supported by evidence and should not be set 
aside. Additionally, even if the Lease could be interpreted to allow the broad stripping rights 
read into it by BCC, the court also found the Lease itself was void and unenforceable against 
Mary as of the date of the Merger. The evidence fully supports the court's findings that 
Kennecott's violation of the assignment provision made the Lease itself voidable many years 
prior to the Merger. 
BCC further argues that the value set by the court is speculative and indefensible. 
But, again, the trial court, considering conflicting testimony, found that a prudent buyer 
would pay and a prudent seller would accept, in an arm's length transaction, approximately 
!>32 million for the stripping rights. The court's valuation was based on the net present value 
)f a modest and reasonable royalty on the ore that is accessible only through the Claims. 
lie court's finding is supported by evidence in the record. Indeed, Kennecott's own 1981 
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study supports the court's findings. Although BCC argued Kennecott would not have paid 
that amount for the stripping rights, Kennecott's subjective (and self-serving) testimony as 
to what it subjectively would have paid is not relevant to an appraisal of fair value. 
Finally, BCC repeats its factual arguments rejected by the trial court that the legal 
claims that were a part of Mary's assets as of the date of the Merger are time-barred. Here 
again, the court fully considered the evidence and entered specific findings of fact that the 
minority shareholders did not have notice of the legal claims, did not delay in bringing the 
claims, and BCC suffered no prejudice as a result of any delay. Those findings are supported 
by evidence in the record. The court's factual findings the Groesbecks' claims are not barred 
should therefore not be overturned on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT MARY'S UFAIR VALUE" 
INCLUDES THE VALUE OF ALL OF THE RIGHTS AND ASSETS THAT 
WOULD HAVE BEEN OWNED BY THE COMPANY IN THE ABSENCE OF 
SELF-DEALING BY MARY'S MAJORITY AND CONTROLLING 
SHAREHOLDER. 
This action was commenced to determine the "fair value" of Mary and the 
Groesbecks'Shares. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1330(l). To determine Mary's fair value, 
the court correctly considered the value of Mary's rights and assets that would have been 
owned by the company in the absence of corporate self-dealing by Mary's majority and 
controlling shareholder, Kennecott. 
In determining fair value under Utah Code section 16-10a-1330(l), courts consider 
asset value, market value, and investment value. See Hogle v. Zinetics Med., Inc.. 2002 UT 
121, ^ [18,63 P.3d80. To determine Mary's fair value, the trial court correctly made findings 
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of fact identifying Mary's assets at the time of the Merger. The court found that Mary's 
assets at the time of the Merger included its claims for breaches of fiduciary duties against 
its officers, directors, and majority and controlling shareholder, and the fair value of Mary 
had to include the value of those claims. R. 1154-55,^40. The court found in the alternative 
that Mary's assets included the Claims unencumbered by the Lease, which Mary's 
management should have terminated to protect Mary's best interests. R. 1155, | 41 . 
BCC argues the court should have limited its valuation to consideration of assets left 
over after years of self-dealing by the majority and controlling shareholder. But BCC's 
approach requires that this Court on appeal set aside the trial court's factual findings 
identifying Mary's assets at the time of the Merger. Moreover, considerable authoritative 
case law holds that, where the fair value of shares is affected by claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty, those claims can and must be considered in an appraisal proceeding. 
For example, in New York, a dissenting shareholder's claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty can only be adjudicated within a statutory appraisal proceeding. See Walter J. Schloss 
Assoc, v. Arkwin Ind.. Inc.. 455 N. Y.S.2d 844,851-52 (N. Y. App. 1982) (dissenting opinion 
adopted on certiorari review by Court of Appeals at 460 N.E.2d 1090 (N.Y. 1984)). In 
Schloss, the dissenting shareholder claimed the majority shareholder engaged in extensive 
self-dealing with the merged company, intentionally depressed the value of the merged 
company's stock, and breached his fiduciary duty to treat minority shareholders fairly and 
equitably. 455 N.Y.S.2d at 845-46. The dissenting opinion, adopted by the Court of 
appeals, noted the minority shareholder's claims could and must be adjudicated in a 
issenter's statutory appraisal proceeding. IdL at 851-52. 
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An action [separate from a dissenter's statutory appraisal proceeding] will not 
lie, since this would allow a dissenting shareholder, by merely alleging 
fraudulent or unlawful corporate conduct, to seek therein the identical relief 
available to him in appraisal proceedings. For example, where, as here, there 
is "a forced liquidation or sale of the minority shareholder's stock incident to 
a merger," the full and proper monetary recovery of the fair value of the 
dissenters' shares may be obtained in appraisal proceedings in which the 
discharge of the majority's fiduciary duty to the minority can be weighed 
in determining fair value. 
Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
California likewise requires that claims for breach of fiduciary duty be brought in a 
dissenter's statutory appraisal proceeding. See Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc.. 729 P.2d 683 
(Cal. 1986). In Steinberg, the minority shareholders of a merged corporation brought an 
action claiming the merger corporation and its majority shareholders and directors breached 
their fiduciary duties with respect to a public offering of the corporation's stock. Id at 686. 
The California Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit, holding such claims for 
damages must be brought in a statutory appraisal proceeding. The court noted: 
[T]he aim of appraisal is to allow mergers which are advantageous to the 
corporation to proceed, while assuring that minority shareholders receive a fair 
value for their shares. It seems clear that a minority shareholder who, like 
plaintiff, claims that his shares were undervalued because of self-dealing 
and other misconduct by corporate insiders cannot obtain a fair value for 
his shares unless he is afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the 
misconduct he alleges has in fact occurred. 
Id. at 690 (emphasis added). 
The Indiana Supreme Court also has held that a minority shareholder must present 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty in a statutory appraisal proceeding. Fleming v. 
International Pizza Supply Corp.. 676 N.E.2d 1051 (Ind. 1997). In Fleming, a minority 
shareholder dissented from an asset sale and sought recovery for breach of fiduciary duty 
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with respect to the asset sale. He also sought recovery for breach of fiduciary duties and 
duties to protect reasonable expectations in the operation of the business and for fraud in the 
operation of the business. IcL at 1052, 1055.2 The court held the dissenting shareholder 
could, and must, litigate claims for breach of fiduciary duty in a statutory appraisal 
proceeding. "[I]t is perfectly consistent with the shareholder's claim for payment in the 
appraisal process for the shareholder to allege that the value assigned to the shares in the 
merger or asset sale was too low because of the breach of fiduciary duty or fraud on the part 
of majority shareholders." Id. at 1057. 
Delaware is another state that allows dissenting shareholders to litigate claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty in a statutory appraisal proceeding. In Weinberger v. UOP. Inc., 
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court adopted a "liberalized" appraisal 
proceeding in which the court takes into account "all relevant factors" including damages 
resulting from fraud or self-dealing in the merger transaction. IcL at 714. Although BCC 
argues Weinberger allows courts only to consider breaches of fiduciary duties in relation to 
the merger, Delaware case law is to the contrary. See Glassman v. Unocal Expl. Corp.. 777 
A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001) (scope of appraisal includes "all relevant factors" including 
damages and Weinberger "should not be read to restrict the elements of value that properly 
may be considered in an appraisal") (emphasis in original); Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc.. 
505 A.2d 757, 763-66 (Del. Ch. 1986) (pre-merger self dealing claims, to which minority 
2Contrary to BCC's contention, the fiduciary breaches claimed in Fleming were not 
estricted to fiduciary breaches related to the asset sale: "[H]ere the problem is whether the 
alue of the corporation was depleted prior to the asset sale by breach of fiduciary duty and 
-aud." Fleming. 676 N.E. 2d at 1056. 
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shareholder had a proportionate right, may be litigated as evidence of fair value in appraisal 
proceeding). 
The Utah Supreme Court has, by implication, approved this approach. In Hogle v. 
Zinetics Medical Inc.. 2002 UT 121, 63 P.3d 80, minority shareholders dissenting from an 
asset sale presented evidence that the value of their shares was artificially depressed by the 
majority shareholder's self dealing. IcL/ft 15. The district court considered the minority's 
evidence, but denied the claims on the merits. Id The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court. IdL 
The trial court cannot determine Mary's fair value without considering the breaches 
of fiduciary duty affecting its value. The court thus correctly considered the effect of 
Kennecott's self-dealing on the fair value of Mary's assets. In doing so, the trial court did 
not sweep away controls on corporate governance as BCC argues. On the contrary, the rule 
BCC proposes would sweep away protection of minority shareholders' rights by allowing 
a majority and controlling shareholder to depress the apparent value of the corporation's 
shares through self-dealing, then freeze the minority shareholders out at a bargain price 
through a cash-out merger. The cases discussed above do not allow such manipulation of 
corporate matters by the majority, nor should this Court. Consequently, the trial court's 
finding that Mary's assets at the time of the Merger included its claims for breaches of 
fiduciary duties should be upheld. 
BCC also argues the Groesbecks may not base the value of the stripping rights on the 
value to Kennecott of mining its own ore on its own land. That argument ignores the reality 
that the stripping rights have actual value that is capable of determination. Had Mary and 
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Kennecott negotiated at arm's length, Kennecott would have had to pay that fair value to 
reach the minerals at issue. The basis of the valuation is not any particular value of the 
stripping rights to Kennecott. Instead, the basis of the valuation is the fair royalty rate or 
percent of net revenues a prudent operator would pay for the right to strip the surface of the 
Claims to obtain access to ore. The Groesbecks' expert witnesses testified ths fair royalty 
rate was two percent and the fair percent of net cash flows was fifteen percent. They also 
testified their determinations of those reasonable rates—which the court adopted—were 
based on their background and experience in the mining industry and the type of interest 
commonly purchased by investors in mining properties. R. 1194, p. 338-39. BCC offered 
no evidence to contravene the reasonableness of the royalty rates or the method of 
calculating the value of the stripping rights. 
Moreover, the trial court correctly determined the net present value of the two percent 
royalty and fifteen percent of net cash flows with reference to Kennecott mining plans and 
costs, along with other factors such as metal prices and discount rates. The court's approach 
was appropriate because the Claims are located in the Bingham District and Kennecott 
turned out to be the operator that exploited the stripping rights. In this way, the valuation 
by the Groesbecks' experts is identical to the valuation by BCC's expert, which was also 
determined by reference to Kennecott's mining plans and costs. Because the Claims are 
located in the Bingham District near a massive ore body, exploiting the stripping rights to 
the Claims provides access to ore worth billions of dollars in revenues and hundreds of 
nillions of dollars in profits. The fair value of the stripping rights is therefore about $32 
lillion, according to the trial court. Exploiting stripping rights associated with different 
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mining claims in a different mining district located a different distance from a different ore 
body would provide access to a different amount of ore worth a different amount of money. 
This illustrates that the fair value of such stripping rights, although based on a two percent 
net smelter returns royalty or fifteen percent of the net cash flows, would be different. 
Hence the amount of ore made accessible by exploiting the stripping rights is relevant to 
determining the value of the rights and was properly considered by the court in its valuation. 
Had Kennecott not engaged in self-dealing that failed to compensate Mary for the 
value of the stripping rights, there would be no need for such an analysis. Indeed, the court 
found in the alternative that even if Kennecott had not stripped Mary's Claims already, the 
value of the Claims unencumbered by the Lease would be based on a royalty that would have 
been negotiated with an economically prudent purchaser of the stripping rights. BCC's own 
witness testified that the decision would have been made on an economically prudent basis. 
The court's valuation therefore is not based on a value unique to Kennecott. 
The cases BCC cites are inapposite. In Hogle v. Zinetics Medical Inc., the court held 
dissenting shareholders were not entitled to any unique value of their shares to the 
corporation surviving a merger. 2002 UT 121, ^ [17, 63 P.3d 80. In the present case, the 
Groesbecks do not claim their shares have any unique value different from the rest of the 
shares of Mary. In Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton, minority shareholders dissented from 
a sale of a company's assets. 937 P.2d 130,131 (Utah 1997). Because the assets had special 
value to the purchaser, the purchaser paid a premium for the assets. The value of the 
company, appraised as of immediately before the asset sale, turned out to be lower than the 




sale, they were not permitted to consider the price actually paid for the assets in determining 
the fair value of their shares. Id. at 134. Here, the Groesbecks do not seek any special value 
to the stock obtained by BCC or Kennecott as a result of the Merger. Instead, the 
Groesbecks seek to establish the fair value of the stripping rights Mary gratuitously and 
incestuously ceded to Kennecott before the Merger. 
BCC argues for the first time on appeal Mary's directors were deprived the protection 
of procedural rules for derivative actions by shareholder that require a demand on the 
directors and a complaint pled with particularity. It is well established that issues raised for 
the first time on appeal should not be considered by the Court. Smith v. Four Corners 
Mental Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, f 19,70 P.3d 904. Even assuming the Groesbecks' claims 
are derivative, however, the court found Mary's minority shareholders did not have notice 
of such claims prior to the Merger because Mary's majority and controlling shareholder and 
its hand-picked management failed to disclose and concealed from the minority shareholders 
facts that would give rise to such claims. R. 1149-54, ffi[28, 33, 35(d), 35(f), 35(h), 37, & 
38. By concealing facts giving rise to claims for self-dealing and then freezing out minority 
shareholders before such facts are discovered, Kennecott and the management it chose for 
Mary (and now BCC) denied the minority shareholders the opportunity to assert claims 
during Mary's existence. BCC cannot now complain those procedures were not followed 
when Mary no longer exists. 
At various places in its brief, BCC infers it was the Groesbecks' burden to convince 
other minority shareholders to dissent from the majority shareholder's actions, and suggests 
he Groesbecks' were outvoted by the other minority shareholders. See e.g. Brief of 
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Appellant at 22, 31-32. But when it comes to self-dealing by the majority shareholder, the 
fairness of the transaction is subject to the strict judicial scrutiny, and the burden is on BCC 
to show fairness. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851(c); Hansen v. Granite Holding Co.. 117 
Utah 530, 218 P.2d 274, 279-80 (1950) (where corporation's management is interested in 
any deal with corporation, dealings must be carried on with utmost fairness and good faith, 
and court will carefully scrutinize the dealings of management and set aside such transactions 
on slight grounds). Moreover, the Groesbecks were not outvoted in corporate governance 
matters by the other minority shareholders.3 
Although BCC wishes otherwise, the Merger of Mary into BCC did not extinguish 
the Groesbecks5 right to their proportional share of the value of all of Mary's assets. Instead, 
the trial court found the assets of Mary existing at the time of the Merger included Mary's 
claims against its management and majority shareholder for self-dealing with respect to the 
stripping rights in breach of their fiduciary duties. The court properly considered the value 
of those claims in determining the fair value of the Groesbecks' Shares. Moreover, the 
Groesbecks do not, as BCC argues, seek a windfall. The Groesbecks seek only their share 
of the fair value Mary would have received had Mary acted in its own interests instead of 
3At the time of the 1979 shareholder meeting at which Anaconda caused Mary to enter 
into the Lease, Anaconda owned 841,323 shares of Mary. Ex. 123, p.4. At the meeting, 
860,305 shares voted in favor of entering into the Lease, Ex. 2, p.3, thus 18,982 minority 
shares voted in favor of entering into the Lease. But 44,161 minority shares opposed 
entering into the Lease. Id. Similarly, at the time of the 1997 shareholder meeting at which 
Kennecott caused Mary to enter into the Merger, Kennecott owned 844,989 shared of Mary. 
Ex. 23, p.2. At the meeting, 861,939 shares voted in favor of the merger, Ex. 112, p.4, 
thus 16,950 minority shares voted in favor of the Merger. But 36,801 minority shares 
opposed entering into the Merger. Thus the Groesbecks were not outvoted by other minority 
shareholders in matters relating to Mary. 
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Kennecott's. If fair value is paid, then no windfall is had by any party. If fair value is not 
paid, it is Kennecott, not the Groesbecks, that reaps the windfall. 
II. THE COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF THE 
INTENT OF THE MINING LEASE TO RESOLVE AMBIGUITY 
RESULTING FROM MISSING TERMS. 
The trial court properly considered Mary's representations made to its minority 
shareholders and other evidence, which prove that the parties to the Mining Lease intended 
to omit stripping rights from the Lease. "The underlying purpose in construing or 
interpreting contractual provisions is to determine the intentions of the parties. The court 
may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions where the contractual provision is 
ambiguous." Peterson v. Coca Cola USA. 2002 UT 42, f9, 48 P.3d 941. "A lease 
agreement, like any contract, is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies. When determining whether a contract term is ambiguous, the court is not 
limited to the contract itself." Nielsen v. Gold's Gvm. 2003 UT 37, [^10, 78 P.3d 600 
(emphasis added) (citations and internal quotes omitted). "When determining whether a 
contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered. . . . A judge should 
therefore consider any credible evidence offered to show the parties' intention." Yeargin, 
Inc.v.TaxComm'n, 2001 UT 11, f 39, 20 P.3d 287 (ellipses in original) (emphasis added). 
The very Lease language BCC quotes in its brief shows the Lease does not grant the 
right to strip the Claims for the benefit of adjacent property. The Lease grants the right, 
to develop, extract, take, mine, save, and sell minerals from the [Claims], and 
to engage in related operations with respect to all veins, loads and mineral 
deposits contained in or on the [Claims] . . . . 
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Ex. 3, p.2 (emphasis added). The Lease is silent as to stripping waste from the Claims to 
enable the lessee to extract ore not "contained in or on the [Claims]." Thus the Lease 
unambiguously does not grant the lessee the right to strip the surface of the Claims for the 
benefit of other property. Accordingly, any error by the trial court in admitting extrinsic 
evidence is harmless. 
Alternatively, at most, the exclusion of stripping rights from the Lease creates 
ambiguity with respect to the parties' intent. Accordingly, the court did not err by 
considering extrinsic evidence to determine whether the parties to the Lease intended to grant 
the lessee the right to strip waste from the Claims to benefit adjacent property. BCC fails 
to marshal the evidence consistent with the court's finding that, in the absence of an express 
term contained in the Lease allowing the lessee to strip waste from the surface of the Claims 
for the benefit of adjacent property, no such terms should be implied. In fact, considerable 
evidence supported the trial court's determination. 
For example, in 1978, Mary sent a letter to its minority shareholders informing them: 
"An agreement is now being negotiated between Anaconda and [Mary] that will permit 
Anaconda to conduct under-ground mining operations on the Mary and Commonwealth 
claims through the facilities of the Carr Fork Mine." Ex. 108, p.2. The letter explained the 
Carr Fork Mine was scheduled to begin production in 1979, and that Anaconda had 
concluded the Claims contained sufficient mineralization "to be considered a potential 
economic copper ore body that can be mined from the Anaconda Carr Fork Mine." Id, pp-2-
3. There is no mention the proposed lease contemplates strip mining or will grant the lessee 
stripping rights. To the contrary, the same letter provided, 
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Also, there have been negotiations between officials of Anaconda, your 
management and officials of Kennecott to agree on a three-party cross-
stripping agreement which would allow Kennecott to expand the boundaries 
of its [Bingham Mine] by stripping waste material and low-grade ore material 
from the surface of property of Anaconda and [Mary] adjacent to the present 
boundaries of the [Bingham Mine]. 
Id., p.3. Because separate negotiations were occurring apart from negotiations for the Lease, 
the letter shows neither Anaconda nor Mary intended the Lease to grant the right to strip the 
surface of the Claims to gain access to ore on adjacent property. 
Following the letter, the proxy statement distributed to Mary's minority shareholders 
announcing a meeting of shareholders to approve the Lease stated, "In the opinion of the 
Board of Directors of [Mary], the copper mineralization cannot economically be mined or 
exploited by the company because of its great depth and because it is surrounded by lands 
owned by other parties [i.e., Kennecott]. It is also the opinion of the Board of Directors 
that the most efficient method of extracting the mineralized metal is through the Carr 
Fork Mine currently being developed by Anaconda." Ex. 125, p.2 (emphasis added). 
Although BCC claims other portions of the proxy statement allude to deposits that could be 
mined by a combination of open pit and underground mining methods, the passage BCC 
quotes in its brief actually refers to total ore reserves contained in Anaconda's Carr Fork 
properties, not Mary's Claims. Compare Brief of Appellant at 29-30, with Ex. 125, p.2. 
Indeed, statements by Anaconda's representatives at the meeting of shareholders 
during which the Lease was approved show Anaconda wished to dispel the possibility of 
mining on the Claims by open pit methods. The meeting minutes reflect that Anaconda's 
representative at the meeting informed Mary's minority shareholders, "if it were not for the 
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Carr Fork Mine, [Mary's] properties would lie dormant, because ore could not be mined 
from the adjacent Kennecott pit, but must be mined from underground." Ex. 2. 
Moreover, the minutes reflect when Robert Groesbeck asked at the meeting about expansion 
of Kennecott's Bingham Mine, Anaconda's representative responded Kennecott had no 
known plans to expand its mine in the Bingham area. Id Plainly, if it were not anticipated 
Kennecott intended to expand its mine to include the Claims, it was not intended the Lease 
would allow Kennecott to do so. Rather, Anaconda's remarks at the meeting show it 
dismissed the idea that the Lease was intended as a vehicle for anyone to strip the surface 
of the Claims. Importantly, the trial court found Anaconda never expressed that the Lease 
was intended to include the right to strip waste from the Claims or to mine the surface of the 
Claims, and Anaconda never conducted surface mining activities on the Claims or stripped 
any waste from the surface of the Claims or anywhere in the Bingham District. R. 1146-47, 
H1I19-20. 
Finally, the evidence is clear that these parties knew how to draft a provision that 
grants stripping rights when it was their intent to do so. The terms of the Lease differ 
significantly from the 1963 draft agreement that would have expressly granted Kennecott the 
right to "strip... overburden" from the Claims and other properties controlled by Anaconda. 
Ex. 127, p.4. And BCC's witness testified that, under that draft agreement, Mary would 
have been compensated for each ton of waste removed from its property. R. 1992, pp.88-89. 
No similar express grant of stripping rights and no similar compensation to Mary for the 
exercise of stripping rights is included in the Lease. 
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The court found the terms of the Lease necessarily include a right to strip the surface 
to reach ore contained within the Claims, but the terms do not include a right to remove or 
strip waste from the Claims for the purpose of mining ore on adjacent property. R. 1148, 
f24. The Utah Supreme Court precedent cited earlier commanded the trial court to consider 
all relevant evidence to determine whether the Lease was capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation as a result of that missing term. Examination of relevant evidence 
led the trial court to find the Lease was not intended to convey the right to strip waste 
material from the surface of the Claims for the purpose of obtaining access to ore on adjacent 
property. R. 1146, % 16. That finding was based on substantial, competent, admissible 
evidence and may not be disturbed. Kimball v. Campbell 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
BCC argues that extrinsic evidence may not be employed to determine the meaning 
of the Mining Lease. But the cases on which BCC relies predate Utah Supreme Court law 
governing interpretation of contractual terms. For example, in Yeargin, the Utah Supreme 
Court specifically instructed lower courts to review "any relevant evidence," extrinsic or 
otherwise, when analyzing whether contractual terms are ambiguous. See Yeargin, 2001UT 
11 at f 39 (emphasis added); see also Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assoc, 907 P.2d 264, 
268 (Utah 1995) (u[A]ny relevant evidence must be considered. Otherwise, the 
determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided[.]"). 
BCC makes much of preserving "the sanctity of written instruments" and the 
integration clause contained in the Lease. Brief of Appellant at 28. But the purpose of 
safeguarding the sanctity of written documents is to protect bargained-for agreements 
negotiated at arm's length and memorialized in writing. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dep't 
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ofTransp.. 858 P.2d 1363,1370 (Utah 1993) (courts will not interfere with contracts that are 
negotiated at arm's length). A quite different policy applies when an agreement is not 
negotiated at arm's length; that policy seeks to ensure that one party has not violated its 
fiduciary duty to the other. Where, as here, there were no arm's length negotiations, the 
inquiry is whether the contract is fair to the party to whom a fiduciary duty is owed. See e.g. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851. That standard applies in this case, where the Lease was 
entered into between Mary and its majority and controlling shareholder, Anaconda. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently dealt with contracts in which one party owes a 
fiduciary duty to the other: 
Parties to premarital agreements do not deal with one another at arm's length. 
. . The mutual trust between the parties raises an expectation that each party 
will act in the other's best interest. The closeness of this relationship, 
however, also renders it particularly susceptible to abuse. Parties to premarital 
agreements therefore are held to the highest degree of good faith, honesty, and 
candor in connection with the negotiation and execution of such agreements. 
Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, f20, 994 P.2d 193, 198. The court stated that in examining 
such agreements, "we are careful to ensure than neither [party] has abused his or her 
mutual trust and fiduciary duty." Id. (emphasis added); see also Woodhaven Apartments 
v. Washington. 942 P.2d 918, 924 (Utah 1997) ("parties may contract at arm's length 
without the intervention of the courts to rescue one side of the other from the result of that 
bargain") (emphasis added); Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co.. 658 P.2d 1187, 
1189 (Utah 1983) ("An indemnity agreement may be invalidated . . . where shown to have 
resulted from duress, disparity of bargaining power, or negotiations conducted at less that 
arm's length.") (emphasis added). 
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The same considerations apply here. Neither Anaconda nor Kennecott dealt with 
Mary at arm's length, and there was an expectation and duty they would act in Mary's best 
interest. Moreover, the situation of a company dealing with its majority and controlling 
shareholder is particularly susceptible to abuse. Accordingly, it was more than ordinarily 
appropriate for the court to consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent when they 
entered into the Lease. 
Even if BCC were to overcome the high burden of showing the trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting extrinsic evidence, and the high burden of setting aside the trial 
court's factual finding concerning the intention of the parties to the Mining Lease, the error 
in admitting the extrinsic evidence was harmless. The trial court found Kennecott and 
Mary's management breached their respective fiduciary duties to Mary and its minority 
shareholders by failing to seek or obtain the impartial judgment of an independent and 
disinterested third party with respect to Kennecott's continuing and ongoing activities on the 
Claims and by allowing Kennecott to strip the surface of the Claims because the Lease 
should have been terminated. R. 1151-53, ff35(e), (g), (i), & 36. The Lease should have 
been terminated because it fails to compensate Mary for the value of the stripping rights. 
That fact is not changed even by the untenable interpretation of the Lease BCC urges. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S VALUATION MUST BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE COURT'S 
DETERMINATION OF THE FAIR VALUE OF MARY'S ASSETS AND THE 
GROESBECKS' SHARES. 
Although BCC valued Mary at only $ 1.10 per share, the court valued Mary at $37.11 
per share. R. 1159, [^46. The court's findings are based upon its consideration of the live 
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testimony of the parties' respective witnesses. The trial court's findings must be sustained 
because they find substantial support in the evidentiary record, including the testimony of 
BCC's witnesses. 
"Evaluating conflicting testimony is the proper role of the finder of fact. When an 
appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the lower court's findings of fact, 
'we do not weigh the evidence de novo.' Rather, we accord great deference to the lower 
court's findings, 'especially when they are based on an evaluation of conflicting live 
testimony.'" Hoglev. ZineticsMed., Inc.. 2002UT 121, ^ [16,63 P.3d 80 (citations omitted). 
To prevail on appeal, BCC bears a heavy burden. It must marshal "all the evidence 
supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the findings even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below." Id. 
The Groesbecks' expert witnesses testified authoritatively that the fair value of the 
stripping rights was approximately $32 million. R. 1193, p.283; R. 1194, p.334. Contrary 
to BCC's argument, the Groesbecks' witnesses arrived at the value of the stripping rights by 
applying discounted cash flow methods. R. 1193, pp. 237, 263, 281. In reality, BCC now 
argues stripping rights have no value, but the court found to the contrary. R. 1144, ^[11. 
BCC does not and cannot challenge that finding because both of BCC's witnesses at trial 
acknowledged the value of stripping rights. 
The study completed by Kennecott employees in 1981 reached conclusions strikingly 
similar to the conclusions of the Groesbecks' expert witnesses: Stripping rights are worth 
billions in net income, tens to hundreds of millions in net present value, provide access to 
ore not otherwise available, and extend the life of a mine by years. R. 1192, pp. 96-97; R. 
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1193, pp. 160-61,169-72;Ex. 101,pp. 5-6,16. BCC 's witness, a former Kennecott manager, 
admitted a prudent economic decision maker would have acted on the recommendation 
contained in the 1981 study and acquired the stripping rights if the economic analysis were 
sound. R. 1193, pp. 167-69. The court unequivocally found the economic analysis of the 
Groesbecks' expert witnesses to be sound. R. 1155, ^43. In light of the value of the 
stripping rights, it is no surprise that BCC' s witnesses testified Kennecott had tried to acquire 
stripping rights to the Claims and Anaconda's property for decades, but Anaconda had 
rejected Kennecott's proposals. R. 1192, pp. 68-69, 86-89; Ex. 23, p. 10. 
The former Kennecott manager who testified on behalf of BCC spoke in some detail 
at trial concerning a 1963 draft agreement among Kennecott, Anaconda, and Mary. R. 1192, 
pp. 87-89. The difference between that draft agreement, negotiated at arm's-length between 
Kennecott and Anaconda, and the Mining Lease that form's the basis of BCCs appraisal, 
which was not negotiated at arm's length, is striking. Under the draft agreement, Anaconda 
would receive the gross value of minerals recovered and sold from its property (minus costs 
other than mining), and also receive compensation for each ton of waste removed from its 
property. Id pp.88-89. Under the 1979 Mining Lease between Anaconda and Mary, Mary 
would receive only three percent of the gross value of minerals recovered and sold from the 
Claims (minus costs other than mining and concentrating), and would receive nothing for 
waste removed from the Claims. Ex. 3, pp. 3-4. The Groesbecks' expert witness testified 
that, under the terms of the 1963 draft agreement, the appraised value of Mary would be 
about twenty times greater than the $1 million value of Mary found by BCC's expert under 
he terms of the Lease. R. 1193, p. 287. Although that testimony did not form a basis for 
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the court's valuation, the difference in value created by the 1963 draft agreement compared 
to the value created by the Lease highlights the very different expectations encountered when 
parties negotiate at arm's length, as opposed to when parties engage in self-dealing with an 
inherent conflict of interest. 
Abundant evidence in the record shows Kennecott recognized stripping rights were 
a critical issue that had to be resolved before it could expand its mine. R. 1193, pp. 207, 
217. The rights were critical indeed: Acquiring the stripping rights to property owned by 
Anaconda and Mary would extend the life of the Bingham Mine by years. R. 1192, pp. 97-
98; Ex. 101, p. 16. And undisputed evidence showed recovery of ore would be foregone 
without the right to strip the surface of the Claims. R. 1193, pp. 172, 267-68. 
There is no doubt stripping rights have value. Accordingly, the issue before the court 
was to determine the fair value of the stripping rights. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1330(l). 
The Groesbecks' experts framed the issue as, "what would a prudent buyer pay and a prudent 
seller accept for the right to mine the reserves that can be made available by acquiring 
stripping rights to the [Claims]." R. 1194, p.365. BCC's expert witness agreed fair value 
means the price a property would bring in an open market with a willing buyer and willing 
seller under no constraint. R. 1192, p. 65. Based upon their extensive experience in the 
mining industry, appraising mining properties, managing and operating mining companies 
and mining operations, and negotiating acquisitions and sales of mining properties, the 
Groesbecks' experts concluded a prudent buyer would pay and a prudent seller would accept 
either: 1) fifteen percent of the net cash flows derived from the sale of minerals made 
available by acquisition of the stripping rights; or 2) a two percent net smelter return royalty 
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from the sale of minerals made available by acquisition of the stripping rights. R. 1193, pp. 
282-83; R. 1194, pp.330-32. The court adopted the Groesbecks' witnesses methodology and 
appraisals. R. 1155-56, ffi|43-44. 
After considering the testimonial evidence before it, the trial court valued the 
Groesbecks' shares at $37.11 per share. BCC asks this Court on appeal to weigh conflicting 
witness testimony and evidence anew. But that is the role of the trial court, not the court on 
appeal. Because the trial court's valuation is based on sufficient evidence, it must be 
affirmed. 
BCCs argument on this point is a clever sleight of hand. BCC frames the issue as 
a question of fair value. But what BCC actually argues is that the Groesbecks failed to show 
Kennecott would have paid the fair value found by the court. The probability that a 
particular party (Kennecott) would have entered into a transaction is not an element of fair 
value. If BCC were allowed to make that argument, litigants in every appraisal proceeding 
would argue their subjective determination of what they would or would not have paid in 
a transaction, which is irrelevant to the determination of an objective fair value. The 
argument is a red herring: Kennecott did enter onto the property to strip waste and expand 
its pit. Kennecott did exercise the stripping rights. Kennecott did reap enormous profits, 
and Mary did silently submit without any independent review. The factual issue before the 
court was to determine the fair compensation due to Mary, not the value Kennecott would 
lave agreed to pay. 
BCC further argues Mary would not have ignored its own vulnerability in being 
sonomically unable to mine its own minerals in negotiating with Kennecott. By the same 
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token, Kennecott would not have ignored the substantial mineral wealth it would have 
foregone (billions in revenues, hundreds of millions in profits, years of extended mine life) 
had it not exploited the stripping rights. The court's valuation, based on the Groesbecks' 
expert witness testimony, resolved those questions and must be affirmed. 
BCC attempts to re-argue the evidence pertinent to the factual findings it disagrees 
with, and faults the court for not considering the sale of Anaconda's assets to Kennecott in 
valuing the stripping rights (ironic, since BCC simultaneously argues stripping rights have 
no value). The court correctly dismissed the relevance of the Anaconda sale inasmuch as 
BCC's own witness testified Kennecott picked up Anaconda's assets for "nuisance value" 
and paid "a minor amount of money" for them. R. 1193, p. 148. In the words of BCC's 
witness, Anaconda's parent company, ARCO, sold its Bingham Canyon assets to Kennecott 
at "just a nuisance value. They wanted to show they got something. They wanted to get 
out." IcL, p. 149. ARCO also dumped other mining properties at bargain prices, including 
the Berkeley Mine in Butte, Montana, which ARCO sold for about $5 to $7 million and 
which made the new owner $200 million in the following two years. IdL, pp. 149-50. The 
fire sale prices at which ARCO unloaded its mining properties in the mid-1980's "to show 
they got something" are irrelevant to determining the fair value of the stripping rights. The 
court correctly considered all of the evidence and entered findings that agree with the experts 
it found credible. 
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IV. LEGAL CLAIMS THAT WERE PART OF MARY'S ASSETS AT THE TIME 
OF THE MERGER WERE NOT TIME-BARRED. 
A cause of action does not accrue, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run, 
until the last event that will complete the cause of action occurs. When applicable, the 
discovery rule prevents the running of the statute of limitations until after the claimant knows 
a cause of action has arisen or knows facts suggesting the probability a cause of action has 
arisen. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 920 P.2d 575, 578-79 (Utah App. 1996). 
The applicability of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule require the factual 
determination of when the claimant knew or should have known a legal injury has occurred. 
Spears v. Warn 2002 UT 24, f32,44 P.3d 742. That factual determination, "whether based 
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp.. 2002 UT 94, 
1fl2,54P.3dll77. 
BCC argues the fiduciary duty claims are barred by the three-year limitation contained 
in Utah Code section 78-12-27. But section 78-12-27 incorporates the discovery rule; thus, 
the limitations period did not begin to run until the minority shareholders discovered the facts 
upon which the cause of action accrued.4 The court below found the Groesbecks did not 
have notice prior to the Merger that Kennecott had been stripping the surface of the Claims 
4
"Actions against directors or stockholders of a corporation to . . . enforce a liability 
reated, by law must be brought within three years after the discovery, by the aggrieved 
arty, of the facts upon which the . . . liability accrued . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27 
emphasis added). 
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and did not have notice until this litigation that the assignment of the Lease was defective 
and the Lease was therefore voidable. R. 1149,^28; R. 1149-50, p i ; R . 1150,f33;R. 1153, 
f 37. Neither Kennecott nor Mary's management disclosed to Mary's minority shareholders 
that Kennecott had begun stripping the Claims or that the assignment of the Lease was 
defective. IdL Indeed, the court found Mary's management concealed from Mary's minority 
shareholders the fact Kennecott had begun stripping the Claims. Specifically, in 1992, 
Mary's management misinformed the minority shareholders that the Claims were located 
"above and around" the Bingham Mine despite its knowledge to the contrary. R. 1149-50, 
%31. In truth, Kennecott had begun stripping the Claims three years earlier, thus the Claims 
were located within the Bingham Mine by the time of the 1992 meeting. Id. 
The court's findings that the Groesbecks lacked notice of any claims against Mary's 
majority shareholder or management had accrued was supported by the evidence at trial. 
Undisputed testimony at trial showed the minority shareholders, including the Groesbecks, 
were never informed until the Merger that Kennecott had begun stripping the surface of the 
Claims. R. 1193, 237-38. Undisputed testimony at trial also showed the minority 
shareholders, including the Groesbecks, never were informed of the defective Lease 
assignment and never received a copy of the assignment or consent until this litigation. R. 
1193, pp.212-216, 237-38. And undisputed testimony showed Kennecott's representative 
prepared for the 1992 meeting of Mary's shareholders by consulting with Kennecott's mine 
manager, Greg Fauquier, and Mr. Fauquier forwarded to him a memorandum stating 
"Kennecott has mined and has plans to mine on the [Mary] Claims at the Bingham Canyon 
Mine" R. 1193, p. 139; Ex.110, pp. 1-2. Yet, at the shareholders' meeting, Kennecott's 
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representative misinformed the minority shareholders the Claims were located "above and 
around" the open pit, not within the pit. R. 1193, pp.220-21; Ex. 22, p.4. Accordingly, no 
shareholder present at the 1992 meeting had reason to suspect stripping had occurred on the 
Claims. The evidence thus plainly supports the trial court's findings of fact that the 
Groesbecks' claims are not time barred. 
BCC argues the Groesbecks should have visited the Claims in 1986 or 1987 to 
determine for themselves stripping had not occurred on the Claims. But stripping did not 
begin on the Claims until 1989; hence no stripping would have been observed even if the 
Groesbecks had visited the Claims. Moreover, the Groesbecks had no duty to visit the 
Claims. It is the duty of management to police the rights of the company, not the 
shareholders. At the 1992 shareholders' meeting, the Groesbecks were informed the Claims 
were above and around the Bingham Mine. There was therefore no reason to visit the 
Claims to confirm they had not been stripped. 
Even had the Groesbecks learned stripping was occurring on the Claims, they would 
not have had notice of their claims. The court found Mary's majority shareholder, officers, 
and directors breached their fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders when they "[f]ailed 
to object to Kennecott stripping waste from the surface of the Claims beginning in 1989 and 
continuing thereafter because the assignment was void and the Lease should have been 
terminated." R. 1151-52, f35(e). No evidence was presented at trial that the Groesbecks had 
my knowledge of the defective assignment of the Lease, and no such inference may be 
rawn. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the Groesbecks' claims are not time barred 
lust be affirmed. 
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Nor are the Groesbecks' claims barred by the doctrine of laches. To establish laches, 
BCC was required to show lack of diligence by the Groesbecks and that BCC suffered injury 
due to the Groesbecks' lack of diligence. Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping 
Or. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). BCC did not show a lack of diligence by 
the Groesbecks. The court found the Groesbecks were not apprised of facts giving rise to 
a cause of action until they learned through announcement of the Merger that Kennecott had 
begun stripping the surface of the Claims, and they did not learn until this litigation the Lease 
assignment was defective. Nor did BCC show it was prejudiced by the Groesbecks' 
purported lack of diligence. On the contrary, it is apparent BCC complained not about 
prejudice to itself, but prejudice to Kennecott. BCC claims the Groesbecks5 delayed 
asserting their rights until there was no risk of chasing Kennecott off of the Claims with 
litigation. This is hardly prejudice to BCC, the purported lessor under the Lease. BCC 
should be delighted Kennecott proceeded to mine the Claims. Moreover, it is quite hollow 
to argue prejudice when Kennecott itself forced the Groesbecks into an involuntary, squeeze-
out merger, especially considering the self-dealing found by the trial court added hundreds 
of millions to Kennecott's bottom line. In any event, any perceived prejudice BCC suffered 
was a result of its own failure to enforce its interests with respect to the stripping rights. 
Even assuming BCC could assert the defense of laches on the basis of injury to 
Kennecott, any supposed injury to Kennecott is illusory as well. The Groesbecks' expert 
witnesses showed that, by stripping back its open pit mine across the Claims, Kennecott 
gained access to more than 184 million tons of ore, worth billions in revenues, and with an 
44 
after-tax net present value of hundreds of millions of dollars. This is not prejudice by any 
measure. 
BCC further argues the Groesbecks sat on their claims hoping Mary's Claims might 
someday have value. But the value of ore controlled by the right to strip the surface of the 
Claims was known for decades by Kennecott, Anaconda, and Mary's management, but was 
never disclosed to the minority shareholders. That value was significant, and was never 
received by Mary or its minority shareholders. 
For the same reasons, the Groesbecks' claims are not barred by the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel. The defense of estoppel required BCC to show it was injured by action 
it took in reliance upon an admission, statement, or act by the Groesbecks that was 
inconsistent with the Groesbecks' claims. Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc.. 1999 UT 
100, f 34, 989 P.2d 1077. BCC again attempted to rely on purported injury to Kennecott to 
invoke the doctrine of estoppel. And BCC pointed to no act, admission, or statement by the 
Groesbecks giving rise to estoppel. Instead, BCC claims the Groesbecks failed to object 
when Kennecott stripped the surface of the Claims. As noted above, however, the 
Groesbecks were not informed Kennecott was stripping the surface of the Claims and 
therefore had no grounds for objection. The ultimate irony, of course, is that the failure of 
Mary's management to object is the true cause of harm, because it had the duty, knew the 
facts, and had full opportunity to obtain independent counsel that would have objected to the 
conflict of interest 
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In short, BCC failed to convince the trial court the Groesbecks knew or should have 
known a cause of action had arisen. Because the evidence supports the court's findings, it 
must be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's valuation reflects the fair value of all of Mary's assets, not merely 
those remaining after years of self-dealing concealed by Mary's majority and controlling 
shareholder. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in its entirety. 
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DATED this S ) _ day of June, 2004 
PARRWADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
^ 
Robert S. Clark 
Daniel E. Barnett 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of June, 2004, I caused two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellees to be served via hand delivery on the following: 
John B. Wilson 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-1301(4), 16-10a-1330(l), 78-12-27. 
Judgment. R. 1168-1171. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 1141-1167. 
Tabl 
16-10a-1301. Definitions 
For purposes of Part 13: 
(4) "Fair value" with respect to a dissenter's shares, 
means the value of the shares immediately before the 
effectuation of the corporate action to which the 
dissenter objects, excluding any appreciation or 
depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action. 
16-10a-1330. Judicial appraisal of shares - Court 
action. 
(1) If a demand for payment under Section 16-1 Oa-1328 
remains unresolved, the corporation shall commence a 
proceeding within 60 days after receiving the payment 
demand contemplated by Section 16-10a-1328, and 
petition the court to determine the fair value of the 
shares and the amount of interest. If the corporation does 
not commence the proceeding within the 60-day period, 
it shall pay each dissenter whose demand remains 
unresolved the amount demanded. 
78-12-27. Action against corporate stockholders 
or directors. 
Actions against directors or stockholders of a 
corporation to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed, 
or to enforce a liability created, by law must be brought 
within three years after the discovery, by the aggrieved 
party, of the facts upon which the penalty or forfeiture 
attached, or the liability accrued, and in case of actions 
against stockholders of a bank pursuant to levy of 
assessment to collect their statutory liability, such 
actions must be brought within three years after the levy 




Daniel E. Barnett (8579) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Judgment @J 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 11|||| IIIII |||| I 
Facsimile: (801)532-7750 II II III 
Third Judicial District 
•' JAN 1 5 200 
SAL * SAtT LAKE ^ OUJOV 
By. 
-mpii 
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ROBERT GROESBECK, an individual; 
MARILYN GROESBECK GLADE, an 
individual; and ROBERT GROESBECK and 
R. CLAY GROESBECK as Trustees of the 
ROBERT R. GROESBECK LIVING 




ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
Civil No. 980904874 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter was tried to the bench on August 4, 5, and 6, 2003, Honorable Stephen L. 
enriod, District Court Judge, presiding. The issues having been duly tried and the Court having duly 
tered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants recover from Plaintiff the amount of 
325,204.00, plus prejudgment interest at the legal rate often percent per year from February 18, 
1998 to January 13, 2004, of $781,870.36. Defendants therefore recover from Plaintiff the amount 
of $2,107,074.36 as follows: 
Prejudgment 
Judgment Interest Total 
Marilyn Groesbeck 
Glade $530,067.20 $312,739.64 $842,806.84 
Robert Groesbeck $530,103.21 $312,760.89 $842,864.10 
Robert R. Groesbeck 
Living Trust $265,033.60 $156,369.82 $421,403.42; 
It is hereby further 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants recover from Plaintiff interest at the rate of 
$3,630.70 per day from January 14,2004, until the date this Judgment is signed as follows: Marilyn 
Groesbeck Glade, $1,452.24 per day; Robert Groesbeck, $1,452.34 per day; and Robert R 
Groesbeck Living Trust, $726.12 per day; It is hereby further 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that each Defendant recover from Plaintiff interest at the 
judgment rate of 3.41 percent per year or as that rate may change from time to time from the date this 
Tudgment is signed until this Judgment is satisfied; and It is hereby further 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants recover from Plaintiff their costs incurred 
l this lawsuit. 
2 
DATED this ^5day of Cj^Uft/^ ^ 2004. 
BY THE COURT 
^ t A T ^ 
Stephen L. HenriodJ aiepnen L. nennoa| *<S*^ « "-T ^ - r -
District Court Judgl f V t ^ r ~V -• / " > 
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I hereby certify that on this 13th day of January 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing [Proposed] Judgment to be served via hand delivery, on the following: 
JohnB. Wilson 
Margaret Niver McGann 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main, Suite 1800 





FILM DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Roberts. Clark(4015) 
Daniel E. Barnett (8579) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendants 
JAN 1 57004 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By , _L 
OfcfHJtyCl 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 





ROBERT GROESBECK, an individual; 
MARILYN GROESBECK GLADE, an 
individual; and ROBERT GROESBECK and 
R. CLAY GROESBECK as Trustees of the 
ROBERT R. GROESBECK LIVING 
TRUST, a Utah Trust; 
Defendants. 
rDnnonfism |«HJrU»ED] 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 980904874 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter was tried to the bench on August 4, 5, and 6, 2003. The Court accepted the 
ipulation of Facts presented by the parties. PlaintifFs Trial Exhibits 1 through 26 were offered and 
:epted into evidence. Defendants' Trial Exhibits 100 through 131 were offered into evidence. 
intiff objected to admission of Defendants' Trial Exhibits 108, 125, and 128. The Court took 
intiff s objections under advisement. Testimony was taken from Gerald P. Halmbacher and 
William K. Orchow onbehalf of Plaintiffs, and from Robert Clay Groesbeck, Barney J. Guarnera, and 
Donald P. Bellum onbehalf of Defendants. The matter was taken under advisement at the conclusion 
of trial The Court's Memorandum Decision was entered on November 7, 2003. The Court now 
makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. New Bingham Mary Mining Company ("New Bingham Mary") was a Utah 
corporation. As of December 31, 1997, Defendants Robert Groesbeck, Marilyn Groesbeck Glade, 
and Robert Groesbeck and R. Clay Groesbeck as Trustees of the Robert R Groesbeck Living Trust 
(collectively, "Defendants") collectively owned 36,801 of 971,200 issued and outstanding shares of 
stock in New Bingham Mary ("Shares") as follows: Robert Groesbeck, 14,721 Shares; Marilyn 
Groesbeck Glade, 14,720 Shares; and Robert R. Groesbeck Living Trust, 7,360 Shares. 
2. New Bingham Mary was incorporated on April 8, 1929. Roy Groesbeck, the father 
of Defendants Robert Groesbeck and Marilyn Groesbeck Glade was one of the incorporators of New 
Bingham Mary in 1929, served as an original director of New Bingham Mary, and served as New 
Bingham Mary's first President. Members of the Groesbeck family have been minority shareholders 
of New Bingham Mary during the entire nearly 70-year existence of New Bingham Mary, from the 
date of its incorporation until its merger with and into the plaintiff in this lawsuit, Bingham 
Consolidation Company ("Bingham Consolidation"). 
3. Pursuant to a merger agreement ("Merger") among New Bingham Mary, Bingham 
Development Company, and plaintiff Bingham Consolidation, New Bingham Mary and Bingham 
Development Company were merged with and into Bingham Consolidation effective January 1,1998. 
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Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation (together with its predecessor in interest, Kennecott 
Corporation, "Kennecott") is the sole shareholder of Plaintiff, the surviving corporation pursuant to 
the Merger. 
4. Defendants dissented from the Merger and Defendants properly perfected their 
dissenter's rights. Defendants complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1330 et 
seq. and are entitled to an award equal to the fair value of their Shares. 
5. Defendants were paid by Bingham Consolidation on the basis of $ 1.10 per Share for 
their Shares. 
6. Except for the dispute regarding the obligation to pay fair value for Defendants' 
Shares, the Merger was otherwise conducted in accordance with Utah Law. 
7. This lawsuit was filed May 14,1998. The issue for determination by the Court in this 
lawsuit is the fair value of Defendants' Shares of New Bingham Mary pursuant to Utah Code 
\nnotated § 16-10a-1330. 
8. New Bingham Mary's principal assets consisted of two patented mining claims, the 
lary and Commonwealth lode claims ("Claims"). The Claims are now located within the Bingham 
Den-pit copper mine ("Bingham Mine") operated by Kennecott. The area of the Oquirrh Mountains 
the vicinity of the Claims and the Bingham Mine where mining has taken place over the past several 
cades is referred to herein as the "Bingham District." 
9. The Claims and the surrounding area of the Oquirrh Mountains within the Bingham 
trict contain two kinds of ore: higher-grade ore located at greater depth, so-called "skarn" ore; 
lower-grade ore located at shallower depth, so-called "porphyry" ore. The deeper, skarn ore was 
3 
formerly mined in the Bingham District by The Anaconda Company ("Anaconda") using underground 
mining methods. The shallower porphyry ore is mined in the Bingham District by Kennecott using 
open-pit or strip mining methods. 
10. Removing ore by open-pit methods requires stripping back the sides of the open pit 
at a relatively shallow angle to remove waste overlying and adjacent to the ore. It is dangerous to 
construct an open pit mine with steep walls because of the likelihood the walls of the pit will collapse 
into the open pit. Safely constructing an open pit mine requires the right to strip the surface over an 
area larger than the area of the ore body to be mined so the wall of the pit can be constructed at a 
safely shallow angle. 
11. On properties located closer to the center of an open pit mine, overburden and waste 
material are stripped from the surface first, then the underlying ore material is mined after the 
overburden and waste are removed. On properties located toward the periphery of the mine, waste 
material is stripped from the surface, but no ore material is mined from the properties. Although no 
ore material is mined from those properties, stripping the waste from those properties provides access 
to ore contained in properties located closer to the center of the open pit mine. The right to strip 
waste from the surface of properties, or "stripping rights," thus has value that is separate from the 
ight to mine ore from a property whether the mining is done at the surface or underground. The 
alue of the stripping rights on a particular piece of property depends upon the amount of ore that 
Duld not otherwise be mined without the stripping rights, and is independent of the value of 
hatever ore material may be contained within the particular piece of property. 
12. Before 1985, Kennecott controlled mining properties within the Bingham District lying 
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east of an irregular, approximately north-south boundary line located near the western edge of 
Kennecott's open-pit Bingham Mine. Anaconda controlled mining properties lying west of the 
boundary. The ore on Anaconda's properties consisted primarily of skarn ore. Anaconda's 
properties also contained porphyry ore, but not enough for Anaconda to profitably operate its own 
open-pit mine in the Bingham District. New Bingham Mary's Claims were located at the boundary 
of the Kennecott and Anaconda properties, adjacent to Kennecott's Bingham Mine on one side and 
adjacent to and part of Anaconda's underground mine on the other side. 
13. The location of the Claims adversely affected and complicated Kennecott's operation 
of its Bingham Mine because it prevented Kennecott from expanding its Bingham Mine to the west. 
Anaconda and Kennecott had discussions over many years during which the parties attempted to 
negotiate an agreement by which Kennecott would be able to expand its open pit by stripping across 
the Claims and other property controlled by Anaconda. One draft agreement was prepared but not 
signed in 1963. From at least as early as 1963, Kennecott and Anaconda recognized that the stripping 
rights to the Claims had significant economic value. 
14. As of August 18, 1978, Anaconda was the majority and controlling shareholder of 
^ew Bingham Mary. At that time, Anaconda owned approximately 86.63% of the issued and 
outstanding stock of New Bingham Mary. 
15. On August 18,1978, New Bingham Mary sent a letter to its shareholders informing 
lem: " An agreement is now being negotiated between Anaconda and [New Bingham] Mary that will 
>rmit Anaconda to conduct under-ground mining operations on the Mary and Commonwealth claims 
ough the facilities of [Anaconda's] Carr Fork mine." The letter also stated: "Also there have been 
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negotiations between officials of Anaconda, your management and officials of Kennecott to agree on 
a three-party cross-stripping agreement which would allow Kennecott to expand the boundaries of 
its Bingham open-pit mine by stripping waste material and low-grade ore material from the surface 
of property of Anaconda and New Bingham Mary adjacent to the present boundaries of the Bingham 
pit" 
16. Based on the statements of Anaconda, the intent of the proposed lease was to allow 
Anaconda to mine ore from the Claims by underground mining methods, but was not intended to 
convey the right to strip waste material from the surface of the Claims for the purpose of obtaining 
access to ore on adjacent property. 
17. As of April 30, 1979, Anaconda caused New Bingham Mary to enter into a mining 
lease ("Lease") with Anaconda under which Anaconda was permitted to perform underground mining 
operations on the Claims through facilities at Anaconda's underground Can* Fork Mine. At the time 
the Lease was entered into, Anaconda was the majority and controlling shareholder of New Bingham 
Mary and owned approximately 86.6% of the issued and outstanding stock of New Bingham Mary, 
The Lease provided the New Bingham Mary would receive from Anaconda minimum annual royalties 
>f $25,000 per year to be credited against a three percent net smelter return production royalty. 
18. The royalties payable to New Bingham Mary under the Lease were reasonable for the 
p^e of mining Anaconda intended to perform on the Claims, i.e., underground mining. There is no 
ridence that New Bingham Mary ever received payment for or consideration for the stripping rights 
the Claims, which had separate value. 
19. At no time did Anaconda ever express the intent that the Lease was intended to 
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include the right to strip overburden or waste from the Claims or to mine the surface of the Claims. 
20. Pursuant to the Lease, Anaconda mined ore from the Claims through facilities at 
Anaconda's underground Carr Fork Mine from August 1979 to November 1981. The Board of 
Directors of New Bingham Mary declared dividends on two occasions, once in 1982 and once in 
1985. Defendants received and accepted their share of the dividends knowing they represented 
royalties paid by Anaconda to New Bingham Mary in connection with Anaconda's activities under 
the 1979 Lease. At no time did Anaconda conduct any surface mining activities on the Claims or 
strip any waste or overburden from the surface of the Claims. Anaconda never performed any open-
pit or surface mining in the Bingham District. 
21. Effective September 12,1985, Kennecott purchased Anaconda's assets located in and 
around the Oquirrh Mountains, Utah, including Anaconda's shares of New Bingham Mary stock. 
22. Following Kennecott's purchase of Anaconda's assets, Kennecott was at all times 
New Bingham Mary's majority and controlling shareholder and controlled all aspects of New 
Bingham Mary's governance, assets and affairs. From the time Kennecott purchased Anaconda's 
issets until the Merger, all of New Bingham Mary's officers and directors were officers, directors, 
>r employees of Kennecott. As such, a conflict of interest existed between Kennecott and its 
esignated officers, directors and employees whom it caused to be elected as New Bingham Mary's 
fficers and directors (on the one hand), and New Bingham Mary and New Bingham Mary's minority 
lareholders (on the other hand) with respect to dealings in which the interests of Kennecott were 
verse to the interests of New Bingham Mary and New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders. 
23. The Lease provides in part that, subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, 
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"Anaconda, or its successors, shall not assign this Mining Lease or any interest therein,, and shall, not 
s me Property or any part thereof, or any ege appurtenant thereto, or suffer any 
other person use the Property or any portion thereof without written consent 
of Lessor, provided that such consent shall ih i h* unreasonably withheld. Any such assignment oi 
sublet )ut such consent shall be void and shall, at the essor, terminate this Mining 
Lease." 
The Lease does not discuss the right, to strip the surface of the Claims, The terms of 
the Lease include * o mine ore on the surface of the Claims (which m\ essai ily involves the 
right to strip the surface to reach oir .H. :».;• ;»laim*), but do not grant a right to remove oi sli i|f 
overburden oi waste from the Claims for the purpose of mini * adjacent property. 
25. Anaconda"N1 mien/Ml midei (tie Lease was purportedly assigned tu Kennecolt on 
November 2, 1987. No written consent to the iiSNijMiim'ril was obtained prior to the assignment. 
Pursuant to tiir irntK nl iho Lease, the assignment was void, and New itm^hdm Mary had the right 
thereafter to terminate the Lease. K (MHKYOI I thereafter recognized that the Lease provided 
)u (icvii ii| assignment was void and that New Bingham Man
 ?ght thereafter to terminate the 
.ease, but Kennecott did ii i m \\u i cause New Bingham Mary to terminate the I east; K rnnecott 
id not ever disclose to New Bingham Mary's inioui ilv shareholders that the assignment was void 
id that New Bmgham Mary had the right to terminate the Lease. Rathei Kcunc-. ott subsequently 
used New Bingham Mary to |nn\ nlr N«'" liingham Mary's written consent to assignment uf 
laconda's interest under the Lease to Kennecott on s ' 
26. 1 o ti'isiii i: IIMI I" lew Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders received fair value 
for the right to strip the surfaa », <i * l»«, i latins, independent officers and directors of New Bingham 
Mary, acting in the best interests of New Bingham Ma sority shareholders, would have 
terminated the 1 east1 M\\ i 'New Bingham Mary's written consent was not obtained pi ior to 
assignment to Kennecott of Anaconda's iiiirti i mutti ilie Lease, 
\i the time Kennecott caused New Bingham Mary f.'i r»n," HI»' \Aiitten consent to the 
assignment, Kennecott and Nrv H >«i}.'liam IViaiy "s officers and directors knew the value of the right 
to strip the surface of the Claims and knew the Claims , .1 .1 'atio.11 with respect to 
westward exp* "<i<*n nil IK- Bingham Mine. 
Neither Kennecott nor New RHIUIMIH iviary s officers or directors informed New 
Bingh> ' s minority shareholders that New Bingham Man pi 1 u v\ M11en consent was not 
obtained before Anaconda's mln est m 1 lu' 1 ,ease was assigned to Kennecott, that assignmew ol 11i-; 
Lease was void, and New Bingham Mary had, but did not exercise, the right to terminate the Lease. 
Defendants did ; rior to this litigation that New Bingham Mar\ "^  imoi ^MIU'M consent 
was not obtained before the lessee's iiitnest in (he I ease was assigned to Kennecott, the assignment 
A iNew Bingham Mary had, but failed to exercise, the iifihi M in initiate the Lease. 
29. Without •-. its interpretation to the minority shareholders, Keiiiitvui 
internally viewed the Lease and the assignment to lnrluik. niilinni t.ui stripping rights to the Claims. 
30. KeniuT'iH iiegan stripping waste from the surface of the Honns a,* part ul its 
expansion of its Bingham Mine during 1989 * ainued stripping waste from the Claims thereafter. 
Kennecott and New Bingham Mary's officers JHII iimrtm , knvw Kennecott had 
egun stripping the surfa<*»'" «if itie 1 Jainis, but did not disclose to New Bingham M» 
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shareholders that Kennecott was stripping waste from the surface of the Claims as part of an. 
expansion of the Bingham Mine At a 1992 annual meeting of N»/\\ Bingham Mary's shareholders, 
a director of New Bingham Mai y who was also an officer and employee of Kennecott n mauled I lie 
fact Kennecott had begun stripping the Claims ami inlbi mud minority shareholders the Claims were 
It id around" the Bingham Mine. At the time of the 1^ 9? shareholder meeting, 
Kennecott had been stripping tin- .m t\w r i »l Hie Claims for three years, therefore the Claims were 
11K ated within the Bingham Mine. 
32. KettiK-! -I'll conducted stripping activities on the Claims for appivximiifelv si.\ *w\t 
before mining ore from either of the Claims. Kennecott began removing ore by surface mining *i wi*i 
• if it; oi Hie i 'Idimsaspuu of its operation of the Bingham Mine during 1()QS atiJ coiiniiiicd to remove 
ore from that Claim in 1996. Keiiiiiniii never removed ore from the other Claim. Thepredomi 
purpose of Kennecott's stripping activities on the Claims wa •• nihle kennecott to access ore on 
property adjacent in flu < .laims. 
33. The minority shareholder in, Jiuitng Defendants, did not have notice that Kennecott 
i i I ( oiiuii v npping the surface of the Claims and removing ore from i ,* • . i-erore the Special 
Meeting of Shareholders of New I imi',htun Mary held November J •••'
 7 i . which shareholders 
were invited to vote for or against the Merger. 
34. Had »ln I ease been terminated, New Bingham Mary would liivt been t ntitk-d u> 
negotiate a new lease on the Claims <i i. vl' I ON \ n arm's-length negotiation would have resulted 
n reasonable compensation to New Bingham Mary 1 ' ; lpping rights, the value 
)f shallower, porphy i mined using open-pit methods, and the value of deepti sinii n-
10 
that can be mined using underground iiitmiiy\ 11n:IIUMIN 
35. Kennecott, as the majority and controlling shareholder of New Bingham Mary, and 
the officers and dir ingham Mary caused the affairs of New Bingham Mary to be 
operated in a way that was to Kennecott's benefit .mil lw I In- ildi mient of New Bingham Mary and 
New Huu'.lw i M»u\ s minority shareholders. Kennecott and the officers and ilu'vto^ 'ft Mt;\v 
Bingham Mary: 
a Failed to inform New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders of the value of 
New Bingham M;ir\ :, -^sols, including the stripping rights held by New Bingham " :.r , 
iMiled to seek or obtain \\\r nnpum'tl niJgmerii ol <^ independent M • 
disinterested third party, independent directors, or independent leea * • hp 
rights of New Bingham IVs nority shareholders with respect to consenting to the 
assignment of the lessee's interest in the Lease to Kenn*^ 
c. terminate the Lease when New Bingham Mary's prioi miif,^ 
consent was not obtained before (li1 I'issigiiiiKiiii ,tl 1I10 lessee's interest in the Lease to 
hu'iUH-anu, 
d. Failed 1 nngham Mary's minority shareholders that New 
Bingham Mary's prior written consent was not obtained hrl'mi- flu; | imported assignment of 
the lesse* f ease to Kennecott, that the assignment of the Lease wa s 1 
that New Bingham Mary had, but did pot exeruse, ihe right to terminate the Lease; 
e failed to object to Kennecott stripping waste from ^ , the Claims 
beginning in 1989 and continuing thereafter because the assignment was void and the Lease 
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should have been lrmnn;iU »1 
f. Concealed from New Bingham Mai v" s iiiim >nl v *lui eholders that Kennecott 
ipping waste from the surface of the Claims beginning in 1989 and contim 
thereafter; 
g. Failed to object to Kennecott removing ore from uir a —mm ~ ->95 
and continuing l In * HW,I* I •'*)*-1 »c cause the assignment was void and the Lease shuuM have 
been terminated; 
h. Failed to inform New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders KemitA < u Had 
begun stripping waste from the s» P1V,V <^ 'tl\* « 'aims during 1989 and continued to do so, and 
had begun removing ore from the claims during 1995 and continue' i ' i > d- •- « * 11 m i-u^ li ("" 'v>o 
i. i in-'i i" ;«"ii i iHnain the impartial judgment • ' ai. -^dependent and 
disinterested third party, independent direct* -is, • M hk,ui|W'.,or.hi -..^ ai counsel to protect the 
rights HI Ni.fci< Bingham Mary and if M nority shareholders with respect t«*« Keniu\oii -. 
continuing and ongoing om the surface of, and mining ore from the 
surface of, the Claims; 
j . • . t.t. 'he impartial judgment of an independent and 
disinterested third party, independent directoi ,s or independent legal counsel to protect the 
i ight ^  ul' New i iingham Mary and its minority shareholders with respect to the valuation of 
New Bingham Man/ < JH^N 'in-i '^ lui-c lur purposes of the Merger; and 
k. Failed to seek or obtain an impai tial M"! iidqvndc-'il appraisal of New 
Bingham Min\ .issets and Shares based on independent information and all elements of 
value of New Bingham Mar\ s assets, including the deeper, skarn ore located within the 
Claims and the right to strip the surface of the Claims. 
- 36. The foregoing acts and failures by Kennecott and New Bingham,. Maiy's officers and 
directors constitute breaches of their resprtiiv." UAIH MI\ .(,1110; tt. New Bingham Mary and its 
minor ity shareholders to maximize the value of New Bingham Mary and New Bingham Mai \ ,s d.ssd s 
for all shareholders, and the * 1111 y I \ >.,n 1 (i»1i1,111 and responsible manner with respect to New Bingham 
Mary and its minority shareholders. Kennecott's and New Bingham Mai y \s»>ttlm s" and directors7 
breaches duties were continuing and ongoing until the Merger. 
nior to this litigation, the I\\\\UM'\\\ '.haichoMoLv including Defendants, wen.* •-• 
intoi (11ctJ 11y Kennecott or New Bingham Mary's officers or directors, did 11 u ( 1i1< >w 1 lid ni H h. i <H• 
notice of, and had not discoveinl (In , .iluc < il New Bingham Mary's assets, including the stripp ,i 
rights, that New Bingham Mary had not given its prior writ!HI »iwwaw i liie assignment, that the 
assignment «;wis \ou\, l»'« t» New Bingham Mary had—but did not exercise—the right to terminate I lh 
Lease, that Kennecott had begun removing ,iinl i nniiiiuul h\ remove waste from the Claims, that 
Kennecott had begun mining and continued to mine ore from the Claims, t!ut ''IHN Hiiitijiaiu > P M 'S 
officers and directors impartial judgment ->1 an independent and 
disinterested third party, independent directors, or independet - '• • . . t^t i i io rights of 
New Binglum '""! ii \ an"! '!;» minority shareholders with respect to the value of the Claims, the 
assignment, Kennecott's stripping ,. uirrn. or the Merger 
38. Plaintiffhas not shown by a preponderance of the evidence 1 hi* New Bingham Maiy's 
minority shareholder pendants, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have 
'lisnnrr <"<1 p» i"">f I MIS icii i eacnes of fiduciary duties by Ke:nnecott and New Bingham. 
Mary's officers and directors. • .MUUif has not shown by m mrni iiiJorani'.^  <nl (In1 evident, < lliuml Ni w 
Bingham Mary's rnmontv shareholders, including Defendants, «-.»: W ^ I K C ^i delayed 
unreasonably in asserting cla ims . w u*c n ^ <^~^~ L~ ~ 
preponderance of the evidence it was prejudiced by any such delay or lack of diligeiu t \ 
Plaintiff sh- evidence that by asserting the claims for breaches of 
fiduciary duties, Defendants are taking a position inconsist* dienunt, or 
admission bv IJelendants or other minority shareholder of New Binghan \\<v<\ Plaintiff has not 
shown by n preponderant ; .:: via:. . miiuntv shareholders, 
including Defendants, discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable care should h: ^ r 
t . * ujecting to acts and omissions by Kennecott or Neu Bingham Mary's 
officers or directors constituting breaches of their respn lis r fiilin nji • l i J i 
39. The foregoing breaches of fiduciary duties by Kennecoi «.n . New Bingham Mary's 
officers and directors i ciiised Nr*s \\ in'li tm 1\L» \ .inJ tls minority shareholders to receive less than 
fair value for the assets of New Bingham Mary. 
40. The drtSt'l 11 »f New BniL;Iia!ii Mary at the time of the Merger included New Bingham 
Mary's claims for breaches of fiduciary duty agait^ ajority anu 
controlling shareholder, Kennecott. The value of such claims must be included in the fair value of 
the Shares as of the date ,l! "In1 Ma;" i jiul is al I :ast equal to the value ofthe assets given up by the 
management ofNew Bingham Mary to Kennecott in transactions belwn/n Hrw IVHI|IIMIII Man- iml 
K ennewil I I luil were not at arm's length. That value is at least equal to the reasonable compensation 
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New Bingham Mary would have obtained for the stripping rights to the Claims and other assets in 
a transaction negotiated on an arm's length basis. 
41. In the alternative, the value of the Shares at the time of the Merger included all the 
value of the Claims unencumbered by the Lease, which Lease should be disregarded as properly 
terminable as of 1987. That value is likewise at least equal to the reasonable compensation New 
Bingham Mary would have obtained for the stripping rights to the Claims and other assets in a 
transaction negotiated on an arm's length basis. 
42. The appraisal of New Bingham Mary by Gerald P. Halmbacher presented by Plaintiff 
at trial was not independent and was based on information provided by Kennecott that could only lead 
to a determination that was unfairly favorable to Kennecott and the Plaintiff and unfavorable to the 
minority shareholders. Plaintiffs appraisal does not reflect the fair value of New Bingham Mary's 
assets or the Shares. 
43. The expertise and qualifications of Defendants' expert witnesses, Bernard J. Guarnera 
and Donald P. Bellum, in evaluating the technical and appraisal matters about which each testified 
is unquestionable by reason of their respective skills, backgrounds, education, and experience in the 
mining industry, appraising mining properties, managing and operating mining companies and mining 
operations, and negotiating acquisitions and sales of mining properties. The Court finds their 
testimony and expert opinions were based on thorough analysis of all of the factors relevant to the 
analyses they performed and correctly applied those factors to the income and market approaches 
they used to value the assets of New Bingham Mary. The Court finds the testimony of Mr. Guarnera 
and Mr. Bellum was reliable, helpful, and persuasive in determining the fair value of the Claims and 
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the Shares. 
44. The Court adopts the appraisals and methodology of Mr. Guarnera and Mr. Bellum 
with respect to the fair value of the Claims and the Shares as follows: 
a. The Court adopts the Defendants' experts' opinions concerning the technical 
and economic factors relevant to determining the fair value of New Bingham Mary's assets 
as of December 31, 1997, including commodity prices, discount rates, and tax basis. The 
Court finds those opinions are based on reliable data correctly applied to appropriate 
valuation and appraisal methods. 
b. The Court adopts the Defendants' experts' opinion that a five percent net 
smelter returns royalty rate reflects the fair royalty rate reflective of the market at all relevant 
times that results in fair value being given for the ore located within the Claims. From 1987 
and thereafter, parties negotiating at arm's length, acting in their own respective best 
interests, would negotiate a five percent net smelter return royalty rate for the ore located 
within the Claims. 
c. Based on a five percent net smelter return royalty rate, the net present value 
of the shallower, porphyry ore located within the Claims is $2,385,745 ($1,368,605 net 
present value of royalties at 3% royalty rate contained in the report of Defendants' experts 
times 5/3 = $2,281,008 plus $104,737 net present terminal value of Lease = $2,385,745) as 
of December 31, 1997. 
d. The Court adopts the Defendants' experts' opinion that the fair value of the 
Shares of New Bingham Mary includes additional value for the deeper, skarn ore located 
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within the Claims. The Court finds that known skarn mineralization lies within the Claims and 
that a prudent person would ascribe a value of $13.3 million to the known skarn 
mineralization located within the Claims. Based on the royalty rate of five percent, $665,000 
of that amount ($13.3 million times 0.05 = $665,000) is ascribed to the value of New 
Bingham Mary as of December 31, 1997. 
e. One method of determining the fair value of the right to strip the surface of 
the Claims is to determine what portion of the net cash flow (derived from the value of ore 
made available by having the right to strip the surface of the Claims) a prudent buyer acting 
in its own best interests would pay and a prudent seller acting in its own best interests would 
accept in exchange for the stripping rights. 
f. The right to strip the surface of the Claims controlled access to ore reasonably 
projected by the income method of valuation to generate more than $3 billion in gross 
revenues and more than $762 million in net cash flows with a net present value of more than 
$238 million as of December 31, 1997. 
g. The Court finds a prudent buyer acting in its own best interests would pay, and 
a prudent seller acting in its own best interests would accept, fifteen percent of the net present 
value of $238 million, or $35,700,000. 
h. Alternatively, the fair value of the right to strip the surface of the Claims may 
be determined by the royalty rate a prudent buyer would pay and a prudent seller would 
accept on ore made available by having the right to strip the surface of the Claims. The Court 
finds a prudent buyer would pay, and a prudent seller would accept, a net smelter returns 
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royalty of two percent on the ore made available by having the right to strip the surface of the 
Claims. A two percent net smelter return royalty on all ore made available by obtaining the 
right to strip the surface of the Claims would generate income for New Bingham Mary with 
anetpresentvalueof$30,534,341 as of December 31,1997. Forty percent ofthe net present 
value of royalties derived from ore located within the Claims (2%/5%) is subtracted from this 
number to avoid double counting royalties derived from ore located within the Claims. Thus, 
the net present value ofthe stripping rights based on royalties is $29,580,043 ($30,534,341 
minus forty percent of $2,385,745 = $29,580,043) as of December 31, 1997. 
L The Court finds both methods of valuing the stripping rights valid and relevant, 
and adopts the average ofthe two methods, $32,640,000 or $33.61 per Share of New 
Bingham Mary, as the fair value ofthe stripping rights as of December 31,1997. The value 
ofthe stripping rights is in addition to and independent ofthe value ofthe ore located within 
the Claims. 
j . The Court finds New Bingham Mary held $348,900 in cash assets as of 
December 31, 1997, all of which is included in the value of New Bingham Mary. 
45. In summary, the Court finds the value of New Bingham Mary as of December 31, 
1997, is as follows: 
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Net Value Value per Share1 
Cash $348,900 $0.36 
Value of deep skarn 
mineralization located 
within the Claims $665,000 $0.68 
Value of shallow porphyry 
mineralization located 
within the Claims $2,385,745 $2.46 
Value of stripping rights $32,640,000 $33.61 
Total fair value of Shares $36,039,645 $37.11 
46. The fair value of the Shares, and the amount that must be paid pursuant to the Merger, 
is $37.11 per Share. The Defendants were already paid on the basis of $1.10 per Share. The 
Additional amount per Share that must be paid to Defendants pursuant to the Merger is $36.01 per 
Share, the difference between the fair value of the Shares and the amount already paid for the shares 
($37.11 per Share - $1.10 per Share = $36.01 per Share). 
47. Defendants are entitled to a total award (representing the fair value of all of the Shares 
as of December 31, 1997) in the amount of $1,325,204.00 ($36.01 per Share times 36,801 Shares 
= $1,325,204.00). The calculation of prejudgement interest at the legal rate often percent per year 
from February 18, 1998, the date that Defendants were paid on the basis of $1.10 per Share, to 
January 13, 2004, equals $781,870.36 ($1,325,204.00 times 0.10/year times 5.90 years = 
$781,870.36). The total amount to which the Defendants are entitled through January 13, 2004, 
Value per Share = Net Value divided by 971,200 New Bingham Maiy Shares issued and outstanding as 
of December 31, 2997. 
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equals $2,107,074.36 and is summarized as follows: 
Prejudgment 
Shares Judgment Interest Total 
Marilyn Groesbeck 
Glade 14,720 $530,067.20 $312,739.64 $842,806.84 
Robert Groesbeck 14,721 $530,103.21 $312,760.89 $842,864.10 
Robert R. Groesbeck 
Living Trust 7,360 $265,033.60 $156,369.82 $421,403.42 
48. The Court finds in all respects as set forth and implied by the following Conclusions 
of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
49. The court concludes in all respects as set forth and implied by the foregoing Findings 
ofFact. 
50. Defendants dissented from the Merger and Defendants properly perfected their 
dissenter's rights. Defendants complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 16~10a-1330 et 
seq. and are entitled to an award equal to the fair value of their Shares. 
51. Extrinsic evidence concerning the intent of the parties to the Lease is admissible to 
allow the Court to determine whether the Lease is ambiguous and, if so, to interpret the Lease. 
Plaintiffs Objections to Defendants' Trial Exhibits 108, 125, and 128 are therefore overruled, and 
each of those Exhibits are admitted into evidence. In addition, Plaintiffs Motion in Limine to 
Exclude the Introduction of Evidence to Interpret the 1979 Lease is denied. 
52. Breaches of fiduciary duty that affect the fair value of New Bingham Mary's assets 
are relevant to determination of the fair value of the Shares to the extent the statute of limitations on 
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those breaches has not run. PlaintifFs Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty Unrelated to the Merger is therefore denied, and such evidence is admitted into evidence. 
53. The value of the right to strip the surface of the Claims is relevant to determining the 
fair value of New Bingham Mary's assets and the Shares. PlaintifFs objection to admission of 
evidence concerning the fair value of the right to strip the surface of the Claims is therefore denied. 
54. New Bingham Mary's majority shareholder, officers, and directors owed New 
Bingham Mary and New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders, including Defendants, fiduciary 
duties to maximize the value of New Bingham Mary for all shareholders, and the duty to act in a fair 
and responsible manner with respect to New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders. 
55. A conflict of interest existed between New Bingham Mary's maj ority and controlling 
shareholder and the controlling shareholder's designated officers and employees whom it caused to 
be elected as New Bingham Mary's officers and directors (on the one hand), and New Bingham Mary 
and New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders (on the other hand) with respect to dealings in which 
the interests of Kennecott were adverse to the interests of New Bingham Mary and New Bingham 
Mary's minority shareholders. Those transactions include consenting to the assignment of 
Anaconda's interest in the Lease to Kennecott, Kennecott's stripping waste from the surface of the 
Claims, Kennecott's mining ore from the Claims, determination of the consideration to be paid to 
New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders pursuant to the Merger, and keeping New Bingham 
Mary's minority shareholders informed of New Bingham Mary's dealings with Kennecott. The 
actions and omissions of New Bingham Mary's officers and directors with respect to New Bingham 
Mary's dealings with Kennecott are not protected by the business judgment rule but instead are 
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judged by the Court on the basis of their fairness to New Bingham Mary and the minority 
shareholders. 
56. New Bingham Mary's majority shareholder, officers, and directors breached their 
fiduciary duties to New Bingham Mary and New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders, including 
Defendants, by: 
a. Failing to inform New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders of the value of 
New Bingham Mary's assets, including the stripping rights held by New Bingham Mary; 
b. Failing to seek or obtain the impartial judgment of an independent and 
disinterested third party, independent and disinterested directors, or independent and 
disinterested legal counsel to protect the rights of New Bingham Mary and its minority 
shareholders with respect to consenting to the assignment of the lessee's interest in the Lease 
to Kennecott; 
c. Failing to terminate the Lease when New Bingham Mary's prior written 
consent was not obtained before the assignment of the lessee's interest in the Lease to 
Kennecott; 
d. Failing to inform New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders that New 
Bingham Mary's prior written consent was not obtained before the purported assignment of 
the lessee's interest in the Lease to Kennecott, that the assignment was void, and that New 
Bingham Mary had, but failed to exercise, the right to terminate the Lease; 
e. Failing to object to Kennecott stripping waste from the surface of the Claims 
beginning in 1989 and continuing thereafter because the assignment was void and the Lease 
22 
should have been terminated; 
f. Concealing from New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders that Kennecott 
had begun stripping waste from the surface of the Claims beginning in 1989 and continuing 
thereafter; 
g. Failingto object to Kennecott removing ore fromthe Claims beginning in 1995 
and continuing through 1996 because the assignment was void and the Lease should have 
been terminated; 
h. Failing to inform New Bingham Mary's minority shareholders Kennecott had 
begun stripping waste from the surface of the Claims during 1989 and continued to do so, and 
had begun removing ore from the claims during 1995 and continued to do so through 1996; 
i. Failing to seek or obtain the impartial judgment of an independent and 
disinterested third party, independent directors, or independent legal counsel to protect the 
rights of New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders with respect to Kennecott's 
continuing and ongoing stripping of waste from the surface of, and mining ore from the 
surface of, the Claims; 
j . Failing to seek or obtain the impartial judgment of an independent and 
disinterested third party, independent directors, or independent legal counsel to protect the 
rights of New Bingham Mary and its minority shareholders with respect to the valuation of 
New Bingham Mary's assets and Shares for purposes of the Merger; and 
k. Failing to seek or obtain an impartial and independent appraisal of New 
Bingham Mary's assets and Shares based on independent information and all elements of 
value of New Bingham Mary's assets. 
57. Because New Bingham Mary did not give its prior written consent to assignment of 
Anaconda's interest in the Lease to Kennecott, the assignment was void and the Lease could be 
terminated at New Bingham Mary's option. Determination of the fair value of Defendants' Shares 
of New Bingham Mary is therefore not limited to income that would be generated pursuant to the 
royalty rate and other provisions under the Lease. 
58. The Statute of Limitations under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27 does not begin to run 
until the minority shareholders or an independent officer or director discovers, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should have discovered, that there was a wrong to be complained of Plaintiff has 
not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that, prior to this litigation, any independent officer 
or director of New Bingham Mary, or any minority shareholder of New Bingham Mary, including 
Defendants, discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, the breaches 
of fiduciary duties by Kennecott and New Bingham Mary's officers and directors. Plaintiffs 
affirmative defense with respect to the of statute of limitations is denied. 
59. Plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that New Bingham Mary's 
minority shareholders, including Defendants, lacked diligence or delayed unreasonably in asserting 
claims for breaches of fiduciary duties, and has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence it was 
prejudiced by any such lack of diligence or delay. Nor has Plaintiff shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that by asserting the claims for breaches of fiduciary duties, Defendants are taking a position 
inconsistent with any prior act, statement, or admission by Defendants or other minority shareholder 
of New Bingham Mary. Plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that New 
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Bingham Mary's minority shareholders, including Defendants, discovered, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should have discovered, prior to this lawsuit, grounds for objecting to acts and 
omissions by Kennecott or New Bingham Mary's officers or directors constituting breaches of their 
respective fiduciary duties. Plaintiffs affirmative defense with respect to laches and estoppel are 
denied. 
60. Defendants are entitled to judgment in the amount of $1,325,204.00 ($36.01 per Share 
times 36,801 Shares = $1,325,204.00). In addition, Defendants are entitled to prejudgment interest 
at the legal rate often percent per year from February 18,1998, the date that Defendants were paid 
on the basis of $1.10 per Share. Interest from February 18, 1998, to January 13, 2004, equals 
$781,870.36 ($1,325,204.00 times 0.10/year times 5.90 years = $781,870.36). Defendants are 
therefore entitled to judgment in the amount of $2,107,074.36 as follows: 
Prejudgment 
Shares Judgment Interest Total 
Marilyn Groesbeck 
Glade 14,720 $530,067.20 $312,739.64 $842,806.84 
Robert Groesbeck 14,721 $530,103.21 $312,760.89 $842,864.10 
Robert R. Groesbeck 
Living Trust 7,360 $265,033.60 $156,369.82 $421,403.42 
61. In addition, Defendants are entitled to interest at the rate of $3,630.70 per day from 
January 14, 2004, until the date the Judgment is signed as follows: Marilyn Groesbeck Glade, 
$1,452.24 per day; Robert Groesbeck, $1,452.34 per day; and Robert R. Groesbeck Living Trust, 
$726.12 per day. In addition, Each Defendant is entitled to interest at the judgment rate of 3.41 
percent per year or as that rate may change from time to time from the date the Judgment is signed. 
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DATED this J ^ d a y of 
BY THE COURT 
67616 
Stephen L. Henrio 
District Court 
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the following: 
John B. Wilson 
Margaret Niver McGann 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
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